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Executive Summary
Interpersonal trust - a willingness to accept vulnerability or risk based
on expectations regarding another person’s behavior – is a vitally
important concept for human behavior, affecting our interactions both
with adversaries and competitors as well as with allies and friends.
Indeed, interpersonal trust could be said to be responsible in part for
nudging competitors towards becoming allies, or – if betrayed – leading
friends to become adversaries.
This document summarizes the state of the art (and science) in
interpersonal trust research, describing how researchers define trust
and its components, exploring a range of theories about how people
decide whether to trust, and describing how trust may work differently
for some people than for others. This primer will not critique all existing
studies and their methods. It is written as a relatively non-technical
overview for individuals whose personal success depends on the
development of trust and for researchers seeking to better understand
how trust has been studied and operationalized, to date.

•

Understanding trust is essential for improving performance of
individuals and their organizations, as well as honing their
competitive advantage by knowing whom outside the organization
to trust. Much of the trust research to date, however, has not
employed experimental conditions or measures that approximate
those appropriate for real world conditions where an inadequate
gauge of trust has meaningful, and often severe, consequences.

•

While a common assumption, the research suggests that deception
and trust are not simply opposing concepts, but rather might coexist
in certain situations.

•

Over the past 50 years, trust researchers have identified some of
the main determinants of trust and the key behaviors it predicts, but
have not focused on the biopsychosocial mechanisms of human
trust. Combining these traditional approaches with those of social
neuroscience researchers, who study the neural underpinnings of
social behaviors, holds great promise.

•

Interpersonal trust has been defined in a variety of ways by different
researchers. Most researchers agree that trust is driven mainly by a
combination of cognitive (thinking) and affective (emotional) factors.

•

Theories vary as to whether trust starts from a positive, negative, or
neutral baseline, and the difference is likely to depend on context.
There are also different models that represent trust and distrust as
separate constructs or as opposing ends of the same spectrum. The
starting point for trust and/or distrust may depend upon characteristics
of the person, the situation, and prior information about the potential
trustee.

•

In a decision to trust, the trustor typically assesses the other’s
trustworthiness. The “Big Three” predictors in trustworthiness research
are ability (perceptions of a trustee’s competence and consistency),
benevolence (perceptions of the trustee’s caring, goodwill, empathy,
and commitment to shared goals), and integrity (perceptions of the
trustee’s objectivity, fairness, honesty, and dedication).

•

Different techniques have been used to measure trust, including
survey-style assessments and behavioral games (e.g., the Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game and the Trust Game). In social dilemma games,
however, it is often difficult to discern whether behavior represents the
effects of trust specifically or of some more general process like
“cooperation” or “collaboration.”

•

Humans have a limited capacity to process large amounts of
complex social information, so they often unconsciously use mental
shortcuts (heuristics) to simplify the process. These shortcuts,
however, can lead to systematic biases and errors in generalized
decision-making, and specifically in assessments of trustworthiness
and decisions to trust.

•

Two complementary neural systems may affect human trust decisions:
an automatic system that works quickly but learns slowly, is pushed by
emotions, and doesn’t do well handling unusual circumstances; and a
controlled system that operates more slowly but learns more quickly, is
more deliberative and shaped by formal reasoning, and adapts well to
exceptional circumstances. These complementary processes enable
us to understand thoughts and feelings from another’s perspective. Far
from being mutually exclusive, these systems likely interact with and
influence each other in different ways under different conditions.

•

Several methods have helped to identify brain structures involved in
developing trust and associated behaviors. Such approaches include
studying patients with brain lesions, use of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), and electroencephalography (EEG). Key
brain regions identified in this research include the striatum, amygdala,
prefrontal cortices, and anterior cingulate cortex.

•

A variety of neurochemicals in the brain – such as oxytocin,
vasopressin, and dopamine- are involved in trust decisions. In
particular, oxytocin, a neuropeptide hormone, has received a great deal
of attention based on studies showing that it facilitates social
engagement and increases a person’s willingness to be vulnerable
within a social interaction. Interestingly, however, this willingness to be
socially vulnerable does not appear to be related to more general risktaking behavior.

•

The behavioral norms and nature of the relationship between
individuals and groups matter when attempting to understand and
evaluate people’s behaviors in social interactions. Some social
exchanges are based on communal norms, motivated by a caring,
emotional bond and a desire to help, while other exchanges are driven
just by market norms of getting what you pay for.

•

Group membership and relational status affect trust decisions. We are
more likely to trust others whom we identify as being part of our “ingroup” or with whom we share a close social relationship, even when
their actual behavior and individual characteristics may not merit such
trust.

•

Individual differences substantially affect trust relationships. The
propensity to trust varies from person to person and from condition
to condition, and is influenced by a variety of factors, including past
experience, genetic predisposition, and personality characteristics,
all of which may shape an individual’s interpretation of who and
what can be trusted in a given context.

•

Cultural norms and differences can affect trust appraisals and
decisions. Cultural influences may also shape how we perceive and
encode social information. How, and the extent to which culture
influences these processes, however, has only recently been rigorously
studied.
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1
Section

Introduction
Trust, defined in this primer as a willingness to accept vulnerability
or risk based on confident expectations regarding another person’s
behavior, is important to many human interactions, particularly in
contexts of limited information or high consequences for a betrayal
of trust. Despite trust's importance and a long history of research
on trust in specific environments, it has not been successfully
operationalized for many broader contexts in which human trust
plays a significant, if often underappreciated, role. This primer
provides an overview of research, primarily from social psychology,
economics, and neuroscience, aimed at helping to operationalize
trust by identifying its psychological, behavioral, neural, and
physiological signals and mechanisms.

1. Truthfulness and trustworthiness are not synonymous, nor are
deception and untrustworthiness merely different endpoints of a single
continuum. Indeed, trust and deception might coexist in certain
situations, particularly in contexts where deception is either common
place or necessary, yet trust is still vital.
2. While researchers have worked to define trust from a cognitive and
physiological perspective, that research has often not translated into
ecological-validity for real world behaviors and contexts.
3. In order to use trust research effectively, it will be necessary to
integrate insights about human cognition from social psychology,
information about decision making drawn from behavioral economics,
and data on emotion and brain functioning from neuroscience into a
model that allows us to better understand, monitor, and predict trust in
contexts where human motivations, behaviors, and the environment
itself, may be complex and dynamic.
Page | 1
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Purpose of the Primer

I

nterpersonal trust is quite possibly the most pivotal, least well-defined, and
least directly measured concept
DEFINING TRUST AND
affecting
individuals
and
organizations
that
must
TRUSTWORTHINESS
successfully maneuver complex and
Trust is defined here as a willingness to
dynamic human-centric environments.
accept vulnerability or risk based on
Though definitions of trust, as
expectations regarding another person’s
discussed later, are varied and often
behavior. A variety of specific trust
complicated, trust is fundamentally a
definitions used by different trust
willingness to accept vulnerability or
researchers can be found in Section 2.
risk based on expectations regarding
Trustworthiness, on the other hand,
another person’s behavior.
As a
refers to the characteristics of, and
practical matter then, trust is
conditions around, the person or thing
expressed through a decision. We
being trusted, and which facilitate that
decide
sometimes
intuitively,
trust.
sometimes after conscious deliberation
–whether to trust. Such decisions are
important when individuals and groups are interacting with adversaries and
competitors and equally vital when fostering optimal team performance (see
Appendix C).

Trust in Complex Environments
The issue of interpersonal trust is complex when individuals or organizations are
trying to achieve goals that are dependent on cooperative or uncooperative
competitors. To meet these goals often requires maneuvering a frequently
shifting landscape of individual, organizational, behavioral, economic, political,
social, and cultural factors that influence both the competitor and the individual
or organization trying to develop trust. When these goal-directed professionals
must operate within such an environment, cooperation with competitors is
sometimes necessary, yet simultaneous motivation may exist to deceive and gain
a competitive advantage. In order for each party to accomplish their goals, they
may have to engage in cooperative behaviors, which – in spite of deception – may
require an assessment of another’s trustworthiness. Many professionals that rely
on personal relationships to accomplish their goals often seek to cultivate trust
and they must likewise decide whom to trust, for what purposes, under what
conditions, with which resources, and for how long.


A previously unknown person may walk into a competitor company – or
perhaps just send an electronic message - claiming to have valuable
Page | 2
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information about another company’s capabilities, products, and marketing
strategy.


A suspected criminal, who has been brought in for questioning, may have
refused to cooperate at all for several hours, but finally, during an interview,
freely reveals seemingly critical information of interest.



A rescue operation might be planned to recover personnel believed to be
trapped in a remote or hard to access area. Analysts have identified the
location with a high degree of confidence, but just before the operation is to be
launched, a longstanding resource from that area comes forward to say the
location is incorrect.



Under tight deadlines or facing critical decisions with limited information,
organizational leadership and support staff – despite differences in their
work skills and products – must be able to trust each other for an
organization to function optimally and achieve its ends.



A team working collectively on a project must have confidence in their
colleagues’ competence and shared commitment to the team’s success,
especially if the team is working in a geographically distributed manner.



When an organization’s personnel are given directives without an underlying
explanation, some research suggests that they may react differently if the
person delivering the instructions is someone they trust or someone they
distrust.

As we can see, trust matters not only for interactions between different groups
and organizations, but also for the internal interactions among personnel within
a group, since some emerging research suggests that groups in certain
environments require a degree of trust among their members in order to
outcompete their rivals or to get their jobs done in austere and challenging
environments.

How Might Trust Research Be Operationalized?
Interpersonal trust research could lead to some important advances in
understanding – and optimizing - how organizations navigate complex,
dynamic and often highly stressful environments. As evidenced by quite a bit
of the organizational behavior trust research, measures of trust used in these
studies, might easily transfer to such organizations, work teams and
leadership. Operationally, however, much of the trust research has not been
based on trust-related tasks or behaviors that approximate those encountered
in the real world. Likewise, most of the measurements and signals of trust
used in these studies thus far would be difficult to apply in “the field.”
Page | 3
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For the most part, traditional research approaches to trust have tended to
adopt a purely rational economic view, which assumes that people will adjust
their own thresholds of vulnerability and confidence in others in ways that will
maximize their own rewards and positive outcomes and minimize negative
ones. But there are an increasing number of empirical examples where
people’s decisions and behavior are at variance with objective and “rational”
calculations of expected value.
Additionally, emotions also affect decision making and can override an
objective calculus, sometimes disrupting otherwise good decisions, but at
other times improving decision-making. Consequently, a recent trend in the
field of behavioral economics is not to view human behavior (including trust) as
either rational or irrational, but rather as social. A social orientation to trust
presents a different set of rewards and punishments than a classical economic
model. But how would this social orientation affect how people forecast or
predict others’ behavior? What is the basis for a confident appraisal, and can
it be modified by experience? These are the kinds of questions that, since the
1990s, have been the focus of social cognitive neuroscience.

Social
Cognitive
Neuroscience

While much of the “deep” research on defining trust has
come from marketing, organizational behavior, strategic
management, and industrial/organizational psychology,
recent advances in understanding mechanisms of trust
have emerged from the relatively new discipline of social
neuroscience.
Social neuroscience
seeks to understand the neurobiological
WHAT IS SOCIAL
underpinnings of social behavior (Decety
COGNITIVE
& Keenan, 2006). It emerged during the
NEUROSCIENCE?
boom of “neuro-disciplines” such as
neuroeconomics,
neuromarketing,
neuroethics and neuroanthropology
Social cognitive neuroscience is a
(Choudhury, Nagel, & Slaby, 2009;
multidisciplinary field of study combining
Vidal, 2009) – all exploring neural
the expertise of neuroscientists with
correlates of different human behaviors,
scientists from the disciplines of social
fueled in part by significant advances in
and cognitive psychology, anthropology,
neuroimaging technology, such as fMRI
and sociology to better understand the
(see page 34 for more discussion of
neurobiological underpinnings of social
these new technologies).
behavior. Social cognitive neuroscience
examines behavior at three levels – the
Social neuroscience examines the kinds
social level (social and emotional
of processes and questions that social
contexts and behaviors), the cognitive
psychologists have traditionally pursued,
level (mechanisms for information
but using physiological measures and
processing) and the neural level (the
imaging
tools
from
cognitive
brain and related neurophysiological
neuroscience (Crone, et al., 2009;
bases of observed behavior).
Raichle, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009).
Its researchers are particularly interested in how humans understand and
control (or regulate) themselves in social environments, how they understand
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others, and what happens in self-other interactions (Adolphs, 2003;
Lieberman, 2007).
Social neuroscientists have become increasingly interested in researching
trust. Much of their research to date, however, has little theoretical foundation
or conceptual texture to the definition of trust. Some consistent findings are
emerging from their research, but the current nature of their research
methodologies and conclusions means that it can be difficult to know if they
are discerning signals of trust specifically, or some other general social
cognitive process like empathy or cooperation.
On the other hand, trust researchers in the fields of marketing, organizational
behavior, strategic management, and industrial/organizational psychology
have looked at trust for over 50 years as an applied social concept. While they
have progressed in identifying psychological antecedents of trust (such as trust
propensity, ability, benevolence, integrity) and the behaviors it predicts (such
as risk-taking, task performance, citizenship behaviors, and counterproductive
behaviors), they have not advanced very far in understanding the
biopsychosocial mechanisms of human trust.
What these researchers have done, however, is to interrogate and deconstruct
the concept in a way that gives it texture; positing types and components of
trust that could be very useful for conceptualizing more sophisticated research
questions about how interpersonal trust is formed and changes. The potential
synergy from combining the contributions of applied trust researchers and
social neuroscientists seems to hold great promise for significantly advancing
our understanding of, and methods for quantifying, different kinds of trust and
trustworthiness among individuals and organizations that function in dynamic
and complex environments.
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2
Section

Foundations of Trust
Research
Researchers have defined trust in a variety of ways, but most
definitions include a subject, an action or behavior, and an
expectation of future actions. While there is agreement at this
broad level, details of trust definitions vary substantially,
particularly on questions about its unity or dimensionality, the
baseline or starting point for trust, and the relationship between
trust and distrust. This section discusses definitions of trust, and
how researchers measure different signals of trust.

1. Trust definitions are often based on indirect behavioral measures. In
studying trust, researchers should clearly define their working definition
of trust and describe how this definition relates to their selected
measures.
2. Theories vary as to whether trust starts from a positive, negative, or
neutral baseline. The starting point for trust and/or distrust may
depend upon characteristics of an individual (the trustor), the situation,
and prior information about the potential person or group to be trusted
(the trustee).
3. Polyvagal theory suggests a possible physiological explanation for
shifts in baseline trust level. According to this theory, the vagus nerve
may modify the body’s “fight or flight” response depending on whether
an interpersonal encounter represents a threat or an opportunity for
social engagement.
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4. Trust and distrust may not lie at opposite ends of a single spectrum.
Rather, individuals may have complex trust relationships with others, in
which they trust each other in some ways, but distrust in others.
5. Most researchers agree that trust is driven mainly by a combination of
cognitive (deliberative) and affective (emotional) factors.
6. Different techniques have been used to measure trust, including
survey-style assessments and behavioral games (e.g., the Prisoner’s
Dilemma Game and the Trust Game) as well as through neuroimaging
technologies such as fMRI and EEG.

L

eading biologists have grandly labeled trust and reciprocity as the “basis
of all human systems of morality” (Nowak & Sigmund, 2000, p. 819).
While this may be overstating the case, by any measure trust clearly
plays important and often decisive roles in social interactions.
Unsurprisingly for such a broad concept, then, trust has been defined, parsed,
categorized and deconstructed in a
THE CULTURE OF
variety of different ways by
numerous scholars from a range of
TRUST RESEARCH
academic disciplines (for more on
this, see Appendix A).
Trust researchers often debate and disagree
with one another about the fine points of the
Consequently, one of the few issues
structure of trust. This diversity of viewpoints is
on which trust researchers seem to
common to many social science questions.
agree is that there is little specific
Some may prefer the complexity of breaking
agreement about how to define trust
down a concept into its smallest component
(e.g., Bigley & Pearce, 1998;
parts, while others prefer to deal with the same
Rousseau et al., 1998). Until the mid
concepts in a more unitary or parsimonious
1990s, trust researchers rarely even
way. Fundamentally, however, most
addressed the definitional question
contemporary trust researchers are not that far
in any depth (Castaldo, 2008). Since
apart in what they think is most important to
then, as McKnight and Chervany
understanding interpersonal trust. They may
(2001-2002) point out, “There are
use different terms or nuanced definitions, and
literally dozens of definitions of trust.
make convincing arguments about the
Some researchers find them
uniqueness of the particular concept they
contradictory and confusing, others
propose, but the core elements and processes
conclude that the concept is almost
involved are often quite similar. We focus here
(impossible) or elusive to define,
on these core concepts.
and still others choose not to define
it” (p. 37). Because trust is a broad concept, interacting with a variety of related
behavioral concepts, it seems difficult - if not impossible - to define simply and
precisely.
Trust may be a single, unitary concept affected by different precursors (Mayer,
Davis, and Schoorman, 1995). Trust, alternatively, might be multidimensional,
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comprised of a variety of different facets (McAllister, 1995). Or perhaps there
are even distinctly different “types” of trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995). Most
trust researchers have not yet come to a consensus on the fine points of the
structure of trust (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006), though they do agree
on some of the basics, which are laid out below.
The ambiguity of fundamental concepts and definitions of trust poses a
challenge not only to academic researchers but also to organizations and
professionals that must make critical plans, decisions, and actions based, at
least in part, on their own level of trust and on their perception of the
trustworthiness of others. There is a dearth, however, of robust scientific
evidence about which elements or indicators of trust are most relevant to
which context, how this may change due to a variety of human or
environmental factors, or how best to measure them.

How is Trust Defined?
One recent meta-analysis (Castaldo, 2008) pulled together 72 different
published definitions of trust from a variety of academic disciplines to examine
what they had in common and how they differed. Most of the definitions had
elements that referred to (1) a subject, (2) an action/behavior, and (3) a future
action (i.e. an intention) and/or expectation (i.e. a belief). The future element,
which involves predicting or anticipating another’s actions, is a distinctive and
critical feature of trust. Deception, for example, is about something that has
happened or is happening. Trust, however, involves present decisions, often
based on another person’s past behavior, that require anticipating some action
that hasn’t yet happened.

WHAT IS A META-ANALYSIS?
Meta-analysis is a statistical research technique that combines results from multiple studies
and experiments. In essence, each component study is treated like a participant in a larger
experiment. For an over-simplified example, suppose we were to use meta-analysis to
examine whether increased blinking was associated with trustworthiness. We would first
identify all known studies that looked at the blink-trustworthiness relationship. For each
study, we would determine how big the “blink” difference was between those who proved
trustworthy and those who did not. This would be called an “effect size” – a standardized
measure of the blink difference between the groups (trustworthy vs untrustworthy) that
explains how helpful blinks are in discriminating one group from another. Some studies
might find no difference, others a small (0.2 to 0.3) difference, some may be medium (~0.5)
and others might show a large effect (0.8 or greater). Each of the effect sizes would be
tallied together to estimate the overall size of the effect of trustworthiness on blinking. The
advantage of a meta-analysis is that it provides larger number of participants (which makes
for a more powerful study) and helps to minimize the impact of idiosyncrasies of any one
experiment.
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The following are a few illustrative examples of commonly used definitions of
trust in the organizational behavior and management/marketing research
literature:
-

“an individual may be said to have trust in the occurrence of an event if
he expects its occurrence and his expectation leads to behavior which
he perceives to have greater negative motivational consequences if the
expectation is not confirmed than positive motivational consequences if
it is confirmed” (Deutsch, 1958, p.266).

-

“accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected ill will (or
lack of good will) toward one” (Baier 1985, p.235).

-

“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or
control that other party” (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712).

-

“The extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the
basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another” (McAllister,
1995, p. 25).

-

“a state involving confident positive expectations about another’s
motives with respect to oneself in situations entailing risk” (Lewicki &
Bunker, 1995, p. 139, quoted from Boon & Holmes, 1991, p. 194).).

-

“expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the likelihood that
another’s future actions will be beneficial, favorable or at least not
detrimental” (Robinson, 1996, p.576).

-

“a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of
another” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p.395).

Common themes across these and dozens of other trust definitions suggest
that interpersonal trust operates under conditions of acknowledged
interdependence and is characterized by a willingness to accept vulnerability
and risk based on confident expectations that another person’s future actions
that will produce some positive result (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Hosmer,1995;
Kramer,1999; Mayer et al.,1995; Rousseau et al.,1998; Zand, 1972).
Some researchers have questioned whether trust and distrust might even be
distinct constructs. One proponent of this distinction is Dr. Roy Lewicki, a
social psychologist, who argues that, while trust and distrust may have
cognitive affective/emotional and behavioral elements, the two concepts are
different (Lewicki et al., 1998). He regards trust as comprising the “confident
positive expectations regarding another’s conduct,” with distrust relating to
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“confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct” (Lewicki et al.,
1998, p. 439). Negative expectations might include a “lack of confidence in the
other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does not
care about one’s welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile” (Grovier
1994, p. 240).
Different researchers often prefer the nuances of their own particular terms or
definitions, which sometimes means that two researchers are talking about the
same basic concept, but using different names or words to describe them.
Tellingly, nearly all of the proposed definitions are based on correlates from
paper-and-pencil inventories and hypothesized associations of variables that
are measured indirectly. The science is improving, but there is still a sense
that, as in the proverb, researchers are often trying to define an elephant, while
only being able to touch a particular part of it.

How Does Trust Emerge?
Traditionally, trust has been thought of as something that emerges in
interpersonal relationships over time. Competing views suggest, however, that
situations and individual differences often create a more positive or negative
(non-neutral) starting point, which can affect the time it takes to develop,
maintain, or rupture trust. The traditional view of initial trust neutrality is called
the “zero baseline” assumption (Blau, 1964; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985).
The idea is that in routine situations of interpersonal trust, people “simply
suspend(s) belief that the other is not trustworthy and behave(s) as if the other
has similar values and can be trusted”(Jones & George,1998, p. 535).
Some researchers contend that people often begin a situation of trust, not at
zero baseline, but at a higher (positive trust) or lower (negative trust) level
starting point due to a number of factors, including psychological and cultural
variables.. Consequently, any individualized starting point is probably affected
by a variety of factors (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998), such as:
•

A trustor’s temperament, personality characteristics, and possibly even
genotype may predispose her or him to be more trusting or suspicious
of others generally. In trust research, this is generally called “trust
propensity” (Rotter, 1971, 1980). Some studies have found that trust
propensity varies across cultures (Fukuyama, 1995; Johnson & Cullen,
2002).

•

A second set of factors comprising institution-based structures – such
as regulation and oversight - may cause the trustor to feel more
protected against harm or betrayal, just as their absence might
increase a sense of vulnerability. Other contextual and situational
factors might also serve to increase a propensity towards suspicion or
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trust.
•

Prior information about the trustee, such as knowledge of her or his
reputation or past behavior, can influence initial baselines of trust.

•

Cognitive and perceptual shortcuts and cues – such as stereotypes,
rapid judgments, or responses to facial features - may operate
immediately for the trustor, even if they are entirely outside of his or her
conscious awareness. Such factors, while difficult to quantify, cannot
be ignored, since a recent line of research shows that they can
significantly affect who trusts whom, in what way, to what degree, and
for how long.

This baseline question is proving to be quite important for understanding
mechanisms of interpersonal trust. It prompts a fundamental need to
distinguish whether we find others to be trustworthy (or not) because some
positive emotion or belief is activated, or whether we make such judgments
because some negative expectation or emotion, such as fear or anxiety, is
inhibited.
Knowing how positive affect/belief is generated or negative
affect/belief is inhibited in trust development– and how these functions interact
with each other – adds a layer of complexity, but one that can be used to study
the triggers and mechanisms by which trust emerges, is sustained, or lost.

Polyvagal
Theory

Dr.
Stephen
Porges, a
Professor
of
Psychiatry
at
the
University
of
Illinois,
Chicago,
offers
one
hypothesis
about
how
human
neurophysiological
activation and deactivation
might operate in our social
interactions,
potentially
shaping
trust
baselines
(Porges,
2001,
2003).
Porges’ concept, which he
calls
Polyvagal
Theory,
focuses on the form and
function of the vagus (10th
cranial nerve), a key part of
the
autonomic
nervous
system (ANS), that is
responsible for inhibiting
responses such as how fast
you breathe and how quickly
your heart beats. The theory

THE VAGUS NERVE

The vagus nerve (also known as the 10th Cranial
Nerve) originates at the base of the brain and extends
downward into the chest and abdomen. It is the
central nerve for carrying signals between the brain
and visceral internal organs in the torso (i.e., the heart,
respiratory system, and digestive system). Perhaps
counter intuitively, when stimulated, the vagus slows
the heart rate and lowers blood pressure, which can
help sponsor feelings of safety and allow for approach
and social engagement.
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proposes that the vagus has two distinct branches – which Porges calls the
“vegetative vagus” and the “smart vagus” - each with distinct neuroanatomic
locations and neurophysiological functions (Porges, 2001, 2003).
The
vegetative vagus originating from the brain stem is believed to be
phylogenetically older and primed for survival functions, such as freezing
during threats. The smart vagus is found only in mammals and appears to
adjust our level of activation and visceral responses in order to facilitate social
communication and behavior (Porges, 2001, 2003).
These functions are an integral part of the human social engagement system
and are similar, in many ways, to the approach-avoidance dynamic commonly
discussed in the psychology of motivation (Elliot, 2006). The basic premise is
that when people are presented with a novel social stimulus (such as another
person) the brain (and the ANS) first orients to it – “what is it?” -, then selects
whether to activate its affiliative/engagement circuits (e.g., facial expression,
vocalization and listening) or the sympathetic “fight or flight” response – “is it
dangerous?” (Porges, 2003). Because survival is the organism's first priority,
“fight or flight” might be seen as its default response.
Sympathetic nervous system activation (SNS, “fight or flight”), however, can be
counterproductive to social engagement. Affiliative engagement requires
attentional resources, so when affiliation is the goal, the smart vagus sends
inhibitory messages to the SNS, which calms the heart and respiration and
allows the person to focus. When a threat is detected, however, and the
immediate goal is to survive, the smart vagus withdraws, which allows the SNS
to accelerate and prepare for “fight or flight” action (Porges, 2003, 2007).
If it is true that without a change in vagal activation social encounters would
automatically trigger a “fight or flight” response, then perhaps the usual trust
baseline is somewhat “below zero”. Thus, individuals would vary in the degree
to which they are inclined to be wary and innately exist in some state of
increased vigilance or wariness. And perhaps when we perceive a feeling of
trust, we do so not because the other person has activated a positive emotion
within us or inspired some discernible confidence in them, but rather because
our natural alarm system is being disengaged. If the warning signals are not
rapidly firing, then perhaps that translates into a feeling of relative safety. As
of now, this theory remains speculative, of course, and does not resolve the
zero baseline question or prove a particular mechanism of interpersonal trust,
but it does at least propose one mechanism by which trust may emerge from a
complex interplay between activation and inhibition of physiological systems.

Components of Trust & Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness

In a decision to trust, the trustor is typically assessing the
trustworthiness of another person.
Trust and
trustworthiness – many scholars argue (Mayer et al.,
1995) – are distinguishable concepts. A common distinction presents trust as
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a person’s willingness to accept vulnerability to another conditioned on
expectations regarding the other’s behavior. Trustworthiness, on the other
hand, comprises the characteristics of the thing or person being trusted
(trustee) as those are framed by the environment in which trust must occur. In
this way, trustworthiness may be viewed as the key antecedents, drivers or
determinants of trust rather than as synonymous with the behavior of trust
itself.
As a focus for research, dozens of studies have explored the potential
determinants or antecedents of interpersonal trustworthiness.
Three
determinants of trustworthiness that have stood the test of time, having been
posited early by Aristotle and continuing through the writings of contemporary
authors (e.g., Kasperson, 1986; Kasperson, Golding, and Tuler, 1992) are
ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; Peters, Covello, and
MacCallum, 1997).
Different researchers have used slightly different language to describe each of
these concepts, but nearly all research has tended to incorporate ability,
benevolence, and integrity. Here are a few examples:
•

Peters, et al (1997) refer to the trustworthiness factors as (1)
knowledge and expertise; (2) concern and care; and (3) openness and
honesty.

•

McKnight and Chervany (2001-2002) analyzed 65 published definitions
of trust and identified four broad categories of trust-related
characteristics, which they labeled– (1) competence, (2) benevolence,
(3) integrity (value laden), and (4) predictability (value-less).

•

Kasperson, et al., (1992) identified (1) commitment to a goal (and
fulfilling fiduciary responsibilities; (2) competence; (3) caring; and (4)
predictability as the four main components of trustworthiness.

•

Renn and Levhe (1991) identified five component trustworthy
attributes: (1) competence; (2) objectivity; (3) fairness; (4) consistency;
and (5) faith (defined by the authors as goodwill).

•

Covello (1992) offered the following four: 1) caring and empathy; (2)
dedication and commitment; (3) competence and expertise; and (4)
honesty and openness.

Each of these more contemporary concepts, however can be traced back to
trustworthiness’ big three.
•

Ability, for example, is arguably based on a trustor’s perceptions of a
trustee’s competence (Covello, 1992; Kasperson, et al., 1992) and
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predictability (Kasperson, et al., 1992) or consistency (Renn & Levhe,
1991).
•

Benevolence is based on perceptions and demonstrations of caring
(Kasperson, et al., 1992), goodwill (Renn & Levine, 1991) and empathy
(Covello, 1992), responsibly fulfilling obligations, and goal commitment.

•

Integrity is rooted in appraisals of a trustee’s objectivity, fairness (Renn
& Levhe, 1991), and accurate/honest communication, each of which
also supports a trustee’s perceived dedication or commitment to a goal
(Covello, 1992; Kasperson, et al., 1992).

Most contemporary researchers agree– whether they subscribe to a unitary or
multidimensional view of trust - that trust has multiple drivers. The trustee’s
perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity (collectively, her or his
“trustworthiness”) provide the key data for the decision.
How do those data contribute to our understanding of trust? At the broad
level, researchers believe these factors operate through two complementary
processes in trust-related decision making; cognitive processes (generally
associated with deliberation, thoughts and beliefs) and affective processes
(generally associated with feelings). This distinction resonates with popular
conceptions of interpersonal trust, as we sometimes think someone can be
trusted, we sometimes feel like we trust them, and sometimes we both think
and feel that someone can be trusted.
In practice, however, the distinctions among them are not so easily defined;
the cognitive and emotional components are difficult to tease apart (Clark &
Payne, 1997; Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Van den Bos et al., 2008). Some
researchers think these components actually represent distinct types and/or
stages– rather than the components – of interpersonal trust, though as of yet,
no decisive empirical support exists for quantifying discrete types of trust
(Schoorman et al., 2007). Differing views exist about the potential roles and
relative contributions of cognitive and affective factors and are a regular part of
trust-related discussions and research (McAllister, 1995; Mayer et al., 1995).

Cognitive
Component of
Trust

The cognitive component, which focuses on the role of
beliefs, appraisals, expectations, attributions, and
judgments in forming trust, has been more extensively
studied than the affective component – owing in part to
the disciplines of the researchers and in part to the ease
of measurement. The cognitive component of trust is based on having
sufficient knowledge of another person to forecast with varying degrees of
certainty how he or she is likely to behave in a transaction, on a task, or in an
environment. It essentially comes from knowing the trustee “well enough” to
feel confident that she or he will not betray the trust. This component
influences a shift in the baseline level of trust from a zero baseline to a more
positive or negative expectation.
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A team leader, for example, might rely heavily on a new employee’s academic
credentials and prior work performance to assess her ability and integrity, and
determine what type of assignment to entrust to her. McAllister (1995) would
refer to this as cognition-based trust. Shapiro et al. (1992) would call it
knowledge-based trust. Both draw on the cognitive drivers of trust decisions –
often as deliberative appraisals of a trustee’s ability and integrity - and are
arguably very similar concepts.

Affective
Component of
Trust

The affective/emotional component of detecting trust is
more elusive, although potentially just as influential. Most
of the early studies simply focused on the absence of
negative emotions, such as anger, in leading to trust.
More recent studies on affective elements of trust have
broadened to include a range of emotions – including hope and confidence –
and to explore emotions that are present and/or activated as well as those that
may be absent and/or deactivated (e.g., fear). The contemporary emphasis on
understanding trust’s affective component leans more heavily on concepts of
mutual affinity/caring and on interpersonal bonds (McAllister, 1995).
The affective component of trust is based on shared goals, beliefs, values, and
even identities among the parties. The trustor not only understands, but often
shares the trustee’s world view and factors that shape her or his behavior.
They are “on the same page,” and this kindred connection creates, or at least
reflects, an emotional bond between them. McAllister (1995) would refer to
this as affective-based trust. Shapiro et al. (1992) would call it identificationbased trust. Both draw on the affective drivers of trust decisions –often as
appraisals of a trustee’s benevolence – and, again, are arguably very similar
concepts.
A research team led by Dr. Jason Colquitt, a Professor of Business
Administration at University of Florida, analyzed a large compilation of studies
from the trust literature, using 132 independent study samples. They found
that the primary three dimensions of trustworthiness - along with individual
dispositions to trust and emotional response to the trustee – comprise the
major determinants of trust (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine, 2007). More
importantly, they also found that the big three trustworthiness factors not only
predicted trust behaviors but also significantly predicted people’s affective
commitment. Affective commitment is one’s desire to be part of a collective or
group because of social and emotional bonds, not just for the tangible
incentives (Shore, et al., 2006). The trustworthiness triad was so robust that it
predicted trust behaviors and bonds even with different trust measures, with a
wide range of trustees, and in different kinds of relationships.
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Trust Over Time
Swift Trust &
Spontaneous
Trust

Swift trust is a concept that describes the kind of trust that
is required in environments in which there is little or no
time to develop trust among persons over longer periods
of time. However, “swift trust” has been a bit vexing in
social science literature because different researchers have used the term to
refer to very different behaviors. The origin of the “swift trust” concept,
however, describes a dynamic that occurs in temporary or short-term working
groups (Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Unlike the traditional notion of
trust being based in social exchange and rational choice, “swift trust” is a
perceptual shortcut used by temporary working dyads or groups, which allows
them to behave cooperatively without first building relationships, especially
when operating under time constraints. This sometimes happens when a team
is assembled rapidly in response to an unexpected event, or when a new
person is inserted into an existing team.

The term “swift trust” appears to trace back to Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer
(1996) who suggest that “the trust that unfolds in temporary systems is more
accurately portrayed as a unique form of collective perception and relating,
that is capable of managing issues of vulnerability, uncertainty, risk, and
expectations” (p. 167). If time is short and the group is temporary, it may not
be feasible for members to spend time learning about each other, proving
themselves, and building relationships before deciding to cooperate. To
manage the ambiguity of vulnerability and risk, the temporary group members
often use others’ roles – rather than their individual personalities - to satisfy
their sense of trust (Dionisi & Brodt, 2008).
Some have used the term “swift trust,” however, to refer generically to
situations in which a trustor quickly – and likely without conscious deliberation
– perceives an introduced trustee as being trustworthy. This might happen
because a person possesses a high degree of trust propensity, but it may also
be driven by situational and contextual factors, or even features of the trustee
and her or his trustworthiness (not all of which may actually predict
trustworthiness, of course).
In the organizational literature, this has been
referred to as spontaneous trust, to distinguish it from generated trust (Hardy,
Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998). Spontaneous trust “refers to situations where
trusting relationships emerge ‘naturally’ or instinctively in the absence of any
deliberate intent or intervention to create them” (p. 78).

Stages of Trust

Some researchers (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 1996) argue
that trust based on cognitive or affective factors not only
comprise distinct types of trust, but mark developmental stages of trust that
evolve over the course of a relationship. According to this approach, all
interpersonal trust begins with a calculus-based assessment of the benefits of
behaving in a trustworthy way, weighed against the costs of betrayal. For
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some relationships, this rational basis of trust is all that is required or may be
as far as trust will develop. The relationship scope may be limited, there may
be little risk, or conversely reputation or actual trust violations may preclude
any deeper relationship-based appraisal.
Because many of the cognitive factors that can influence trust decisions are
founded on a deeper knowledge of the other person and the stability of the
other’s behavior across time and contexts, it is perhaps more likely to occur
only in extended relationships. Dr. Denise Rousseau, a Professor of
Organizational Behavior at Carnegie Mellon University, suggests that over time
the rational calculus typically becomes less important and the relational basis
of trust becomes more important (Rousseau et al., 1998).
In a staged model like this, trust’s affective drivers ostensibly build on each
party’s knowledge of the other, shared experiences, proximity, and cooperative
efforts – typically in a small subset of relationships – to form an emotional bond
or connection between the parties that seals their trust. Progressing to a more
affective or relational basis for trust may involve a “transformation of
motivation” (Kelly, 1984) where the parties move from a primary view of
distinct self-interests to one of joint outcomes. This raises important practical
questions of whether affect-based trust is more resilient to violations than
cognitive-based trust, or whether it is more vulnerable to transgressions, and
less likely to be repaired once ruptured?

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY IN MEASUREMENTS
Within the psychological sciences, the terms reliability and validity have very specific
meanings in characterizing measurements.
Reliability refers to the consistency or stability of a measure. If you measure the same
thing (or person) multiple times with the same measuring tool under the same conditions,
you would hope to get similarly consistent results each time. That would indicate the
measuring tool was stable and reliable. However, this is no guarantee that what you are
measuring is valid. For example, a ruler which is marked incorrectly will always give the
same (wrong) measurement. It is very reliable, but not very valid.
Validity refers to the extent to which a device or tool measures what it claims to measure –
for example, whether a measure of trust is actually measuring trust, as opposed to
something else like risk-taking, social influence, etc. While less common, a measure may
be valid but not reliable. Some have charged that the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory
personality test is an example of a valid, but unreliable, measurement. That is, the MyersBriggs is actually measuring certain aspects of personality, but they are not reliable
dimensions, since personality is not a wholly fixed construct. So repeated MBTI tests on the
same person – even under similar circumstances - will give different answers. Hence, while
the MBTI appears to be validly measuring things like a person’s degree of extraversion and
conscientiousness, those measures will not be reliable due to different influences (such as
mood or priming) on these dimensions of personality.
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Defining Trust in Experiments
Despite having a voluminous library of rich, eloquent prose describing and
defining trust, its types, and its components, to study it empirically, researchers
must find a way to measure it in some discrete scale or task.
Some researchers measure trust by participants’ scores
on a psychometric test or instrument. Typically, these
instruments contain a series of items that participants rate on a Likert-type
scale; for example, responding to the statement: “I can confide in and rely on
my co-workers” – with a 1-4 rating of agreement ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). One serious problem with this type of research
is that many trust-related studies employ trust measures that are inconsistent
with their chosen definition (Gillespie, 2003). Researchers have conducted a
couple of broad research reviews of trust scales and measures (Dietz & den
Hartog, 2006; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2005), but none suggest that any
particular scale is emerging as a gold standard. One large review (McEvily &
Tortoriello, 2005) found that only 11 of 119 identified trust measures had been
used in more than one study and that most studies provided little, if any,
evidence that the scale was actually measuring trust. Other researchers have
called for more “deep” qualitative measurement of trust using diaries,
interviews, and communication analyses (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman,
1990; Butler, 1991; Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Wilson, Straus, & McEvily,
2006).

Trust Scales

Examples of Trust Scales
Scales to measure trust have been developed generally for research in
organizational behavior, not specifically for field applications where individuals
are highly motivated to assess and/or develop trust within high stress
environments.
The measures are largely self-report, paper-and-pencil
inventories composed of items that tap one or more elements or examples of
interpersonal trust. On most of the measures, respondents use a five(sometimes a seven-) point response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree)
to 5 (Strongly Agree), to rate their agreement with each item.
•

Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) have been working since at least
1996 on a scale to measure the respondent’s willingness (voluntarily)
to be vulnerable to a potential trustee. The most recent working version
of the “general willingness to be vulnerable” scale, has five items
(Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007); for example:
“It is important for me to have a good way to keep an eye on my
supervisor”
“Increasing my vulnerability to criticism by my supervisor would
be a mistake.”
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Mayer and Davis (1999) have developed a set of scales to test
employees’ perceptions of management’s competence (6 items),
benevolence (5 items) and integrity (6 items). For example:
Ability
“Top management is very capable of performing its job.”

Benevolence
“Top management is very concerned about my welfare.”

Integrity
“I never have to worry whether top management will
stick to its word.”
•

McAllister (1995) has developed an 11-item measure of affect- and
cognition-based trust scales, to provide an example of multiple
types/components/stages. Respondents rate their agreement with each
item on a 7-point scale as they relate to a specific peer at work. For
example:
Affect-Based Trust
“We have a sharing relationship. We can both freely
share our feelings, ideas, and hopes.”
Cognition-Based Trust
“This
person
approaches
professionalism and dedication.”

Trust
Behaviors

his/her

job

with

An alternative to using surveys and scales is to create a
task that requires people to execute (or not) trusting
behaviors and choices. There is little empirical evidence,
however, that these experimental tasks reflect the concept of trust and its
complexity as it is described in the conceptual literature. This puts a different
lens on defining interpersonal trust. In a neurophysiological study of trust, for
example, even if the measures of brain activity and physiological response
patterns were perfectly accurate, if the experimental task is not driven by or
does not reflect trust then it would lack validity - even if it is named a “trust
task”.
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One of the most common research approaches to measuring trust in human
transactions is through the use of behavioral games (Camerer, 2003).
Emblematic of this approach is a sequential social dilemma game called the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (Poundstone, 1992).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
There are several modern variants of the game, but the classic prisoner’s
dilemma scenario, as created by mathematician and game theorist Albert
Tucker,
involves
two
criminal
offenders who have been arrested
and are being separately detained.
Authorities offer an identical deal (or
set of contingencies) independently to
each offender. Without knowing the
other’s choice, each offender must
choose whether to testify - or refuse
to testify - against his partner. If one
agrees to testify against the other
(“defecting”), but the other refuses to
testify
against
his
counterpart
(“cooperating”) the defector goes free
and the cooperator receives the
maximum 10-year sentence. If both
refuse to testify, both will be sentenced to only six months in jail for a minor
charge. If both defect, however, both receive five-year sentences.
Payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma are structured so that the highest payoff
occurs when one participant cooperates and the other defects, with the
cooperating partner losing a substantial amount, while the defecting
partner gains a substantial amount. The lowest payoff occurs, however, if
both partners defect. If both partners cooperate, each will benefit more
than if both defect. Though the classic game uses a static “one-time”
scenario, variations often allow for multiple
iterations with a single partner (creating the
opportunity to punish someone for defecting
or to change decisions over time as a result
of the other’s actions), changes in the payoff
matrix, or providing information to one
participant about the decision of the other.

The Ultimatum Game
The Ultimatum Game is another commonly
used behavioral game in trust-related
research. In this paired-player game, Player
One is given an initial endowment of points
or money, and allowed to choose whether or
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not to give any portion of that initial endowment to Player Two. If Player
One makes an offer, Player Two can then either accept or reject the
proposed division. If Player Two rejects the offer, however, neither player
gets anything. In theory, the Player Two should accept any proposal that
affords her or him any portion of the initial endowment, because some
payoff is better than no payoff. In practice, many players will reject an offer
that is not perceived as “fair” – that is, close to a 50% division of the initial
endowment.

The Trust Game
The Trust Game is another popular experimental task. This is also a
paired-player game, with one player
designated as “the investor”, and the
other as “the trustee.” Both players
are given an initial endowment of
points or money. The investor is
allowed to choose whether or not to
give
any
portion
of
her/his
endowment to the trustee. If the
investor chooses to bestow money
on the trustee, the trustee will receive
triple the shared amount (e.g., if the
investor gives $10, the trustee
receives a total of $30). The trustee
is then allowed to choose whether or
not to return some portion of the
received amount to the investor. This game can play out over single or
multiple iterations (e.g. Kosfeld, et al., 2005).
Based purely on a rational economic appraisal of utility, because there is
no guarantee of cooperation, it makes sense for the investor not to pass
any of the original endowment to the trustee. In fact, this tends to be the
way the game plays out when the game has only one iteration/transaction
or has multiple iterations but no opportunity to punish players for noncooperative behavior. When game conditions allow players to punish a
non-cooperative participant, however, cooperative behavior tends to
increase, with investors passing all or nearly all of their initial endowment to
the trustee, and trustees returning the “fair” share of their payoff to the
investor (e.g., DeQuervain et al., 2004).

Limitations in
Social
Dilemma
Games

Social dilemma games are particularly favored by
researchers who view trust as a purely economic decision,
because the utilities (or payoffs) of each decision can be
very clearly specified. There are open questions, however,
about the extent to which these games are measuring

interpersonal trust.
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First, there is an obvious question of what
researchers call “ecological validity”: how well
do hypothetical decisions and behaviors in
contrived game simulations reflect any kind of
“real world” issues of trust (Zak & Ochsner,
2009)? Researchers who use these games
acknowledge that "some of the everyday
meanings of trust and trusting behavior are, no
doubt, not captured by [the Prisoner's Dilemma]
framework" (Orbell, Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea,
1994, p.112).
A recent compilation of 84
published studies worldwide using the trust
game found that approximately 40% of the
variance in trust and 30% of the variance in
trustworthiness were explained solely by
changes to the experimental protocols (Johnson
& Mislin, 2008), suggesting that the games may
be more sensitive to the contrived condition of
exchange than to the concept of trust itself.

ECOLOGICAL
VALIDITY
Ecological validity is a type of
validity referring to the
degree to which the
methods, setting, and
activities associated with an
experiment approximate how
it operates in the real world.
Ecological validity also
reflects the degree to which
the results from any
experiment will generalize to
the real world.

Second, even if the games do approximate or generalize to real world
behaviors, can “reciprocity,” “cooperation” or “collaboration” as defined in the
game be reasonably used as a proxy for trust (Van den Bos et al., 2009)? Can
trust exist without cooperation or can cooperative choices be made without
trust? One might easily argue that cooperation is more common and more
easily acquired than trust in dynamic environments where individuals or groups
are highly motivated to achieve their goals and the consequences for not
reaching them is also high. How do the potential consequences to the partner
(as opposed to self) affect the decision; and how might an appraisal of those
consequences be affected by the nature of the relationship between partners?
Performance in social dilemma games would appear to be – at best - a very
indirect and highly confounded measure of interpersonal trust. It would be
useful to see new experimental tasks with greater ecological validity and more
specificity in the measurement of trust.
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3
Section

Mechanisms & Signals of
Trust
Though people may make certain choices based solely on a rational, cost-benefit
analysis, social factors often drive decisions about interpersonal trust. These sociallybased decisions may initially seem “irrational,” but understanding their
psychological and neurophysiological bases will help to reveal how and why trust
emerges in a particular circumstance.

1. Research suggests that people cannot accurately describe the
methods or information they use to make trust decisions. In fact, too
much internal reflection and deliberation may make the process less
efficient and less accurate.
2. Humans often use “heuristics” or mental short cuts - primarily
unconsciously - to simplify and speed-up complex interpersonal
decisions, like those involving trust. While these shortcuts may work
for specific purposes, they can lead to systematic biases and errors in
decision making.
3. Two complementary neural systems appear to affect human trust
decisions: an automatic system that works quickly but learns slowly, is
driven by emotions, and doesn’t do well handling unusual
circumstances; and a controlled system that operates more slowly but
learns more quickly, is more deliberative and driven by reasoning, and
that adapts well to exceptional circumstances. Both systems can and
do contribute to trust decisions, and reflect underlying anatomical
differences in how information is processed in the brain.
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4. Techniques used to record activity of the brain have helped to identify
those structures that are involved in certain trust-related processes like
empathy, acquiring social knowledge, and decision-making.
5. A variety of chemicals in the brain also play a role in trust. One that has
achieved particular prominence is oxytocin, a neuropeptide that seems
to facilitate social engagement and to increase a person’s willingness
to accept interpersonal vulnerability.
6. Psychologically, interpersonal trust decisions tend to be driven by our
perceptions of others’ trustworthiness, as a function of their ability,
benevolence, and integrity.
7. Behavioral norms and expectations vary across different kinds of
relationships and situations.
8. Group membership and relational status affect trust decisions. We are
more likely to trust others whom we identify as being part of our “ingroup” or with whom we share a close social relationship, even when
their actual behavior and individual characteristics may not merit such
trust.

T

here can be no simple, formulaic, or even typical description of how
trust works. Because trust is complex and fluid the mechanisms by
which it is formed and changes may vary based on characteristics of
the trustor, the trustee, their behavior and experiences with each other
over time, and characteristics of the context and setting. Over the past two
decades, the scientific community has been learning more about the neural
and psychological mechanisms of human social behaviors - including whether
particular processes are stable or strongly affected by situational factors, and
whether some mechanisms are more universal and others more sensitive to
individual and cultural differences. Identifying mechanisms and signals related
to trust is the focus of this second generation research on interpersonal trust.
The mechanisms of trust have been broadly classified according to two
traditions of inquiry (Kramer, et al., 1999): (1) the behavioral tradition of trust,
which views trust as rational-choice behavior, such as cooperative choices in a
game (Hardin, 1993; Williamson, 1981); and (2) the psychological tradition of
trust, which attempts to understand the complex intrapersonal states
associated with trust, including expectations, intentions, affect, and
dispositions (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).
Having discussed trustworthiness in the previous section, this section focuses
on the mechanisms and signals of interpersonal trust involved in the decisionmaking of the trustor, and how such decisions are affected by the nature of the
relationship and behaviors between the parties involved.

24

T H E

S C I E N C E

O F

I N T E R P E R S O N A L

T R U S T

Trustor
How Do We
Decide to Trust
or Distrust?

The mechanism of trust – as conceived in the behavioral
tradition – is based on a rational choice model and rooted
in the concept of social exchange (Blau, 1964; Dionisi &
Brodt, 2008; Homans, 1958). Consistent with the homo
economicus or “rational man” assumptions of classical economics, the rational
choice model suggests that “people are motivated to maximize their personal
gains and minimize their personal losses in social interactions, and react to
other individuals, organizations, authorities, and rules from a self-interested
perspective” (Kramer & Tyler 1996, p.1). This is the central assumption in
social exchange theory as well – that people constantly weigh costs and
benefits and make decisions based on which side outweighs the other (Blau,
1964; Homans, 1958). Trust based on social exchange also has a dynamic,
developmental component. It evolves over time and across transactions as
information about outcomes (e.g., whether the trustee cooperated or betrayed
the trust) feeds back into the trustor’s ongoing trust appraisal (Weber, et al.,
2005). This purely utilitarian, rational model has also been referred to as
deterrence-based trust (Shapiro, et al., 1992) when focused only on avoiding
the “cost” of betrayal, and calculus-based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; 1996)
when decision making weighs those costs against the “benefits” of
trustworthiness.
While it appears to be true that people generally have the capacity for rational,
calculated, self-interested decision making under certain circumstances, this is
not their only mechanism, and very often it is not the dominant one. As recent
research is demonstrating, people are often not very accurate at knowing what
factors affect the decisions they make or describing how their decisions are
made. Their behavioral patterns are not totally unsystematic or unpredictable,
but they do not always follow the prescribed rules of rational choice. Again, it
may be that people are best understood as being neither rational nor irrational,
but as social.
This is likely to be as true for trust decisions as it is for a range of other choices
that people make. If you just ask people whether, how and why they trust
someone, they will likely respond with a sincere rational \ post-hoc account,
but, when researched using controlled experiments, it is clear that such
descriptions often have little to do with the reality of how humans decide and
behave.
Despite the popularity of analogies and metaphors that compare the brain to a
computer, the human brain is functionally not well-equipped for complex
configural analyses of information or for context-free decision making. The
brain tends to compensate for these limitations by simplifying the decision
points or using mental shortcut decision rules, sometimes called “heuristics”
(Kahneman, 1991, 1994; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).
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These systematic biases and mental shortcuts have been observed and
extensively studied for more than 75 years, and some of them that apply to
cost-benefit decisions are the focus of behavioral economist Dan Ariely’s
popular book: Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our
Decisions (Ariely, 2009).
One can also find these inconsistencies in
experimental trust studies such as in the Ultimatum Game when recipients
reject an offer and knowingly choose to get nothing because they perceive the
division of funds to be unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986), and would
rather sacrifice their own gain in order to punish others.
Without reviewing the dozens of short cuts and processes (the “heuristics”)
that affect our decisions (see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), three
general cognitive trends are worth mentioning here as they relate to our
decisions about interpersonal trust.

#1

Our limited brains, in order to function efficiently,
attempt to simplify our complex world.

When faced with a decision about trust, there is an almost limitless amount of
data available to us that could affect our choices. Most humans have neither
the time nor mental computational capacity to process it all, nor to assess what
is relevant and what is irrelevant. So the brain tends to pick out what it deems
most salient and to cluster chunks of information together – or to use some
factors as proxies for others – in order to make the best decision possible
under the circumstances. Unsurprisingly, then, much research suggests that
the best possible human decision is nearly always suboptimal – both in terms
of accuracy and the process by which the judgment is rendered (Kahneman,
1991).
Research on the social psychology and social neuroscience of stereotyping
behaviors illustrates how these simplifying mechanisms sometimes work,
particularly in people's judgments based on features like appearance, race and
gender. Researchers have presented subjects with pictures of strangers’
faces. Some faces are consistently rated as being more trustworthy than
others (Todorov, 2008). In fact, very high levels of agreement emerge about
what untrustworthy people “should” look like. The brain uses those cues to
render a quick judgment within 150 milliseconds (Engell et al, 2007; Todorov et
al, 2009). Those consensus impressions, however, tend not to correspond to
the pictured persons' actual trust-related behavior or their trustworthiness for
any specific environment (Engell et al, 2007; Gordon & Platek, 2009). The
untrustworthy valence also evokes an automatic emotional response. When a
person views an untrustworthy face, the brain’s amygdala (fear center) is
activated, and this is true even when the person is not first primed to assess
the other’s trustworthiness (Breiter et al., 1996; Frith & Frith, 2006; Frith &
Singer, 2008).
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These processes can carry over into various forms of prejudice as well
(Jenkins, et al., 2009). Prior studies have shown the amygdala to react more to
“negative attitude” stimuli than to “positive attitude” stimuli, and across studies,
even with different methods, when Caucasian or African American research
subjects are presented with the picture of an African American person, the
amygdala is often activated (Eberhardt, 2005; Ito & Bartholow, 2009; Ito, et al.,
2006; Lieberman, et al., 2005; Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). The degree of
activation varies somewhat from subject-to-subject and is statistically related to
implicit (unconscious) measures of prejudice, but not to explicit measures of
prejudice - an example of how conscious appraisals of our own cognitive
processes are often at variance with our actual behavior and our implicit
attitudes (Ito & Barthlow, 2009).
In a study of gender-based perceptions and trust, Orbell and colleagues (1994)
assigned judges to predict whether players would cooperate or defect in a
“trust” social dilemma game. Both male and female judges predicted the
female player would cooperate much more often than male players, though
this expectation was not confirmed in the player’s actual performance. The
judges did not explicitly use gender as a basis for their predictions or for
choosing whether to play the game with a particular individual. This could
simply reflect an implicit bias, but it could also suggest that the stereotypic
biases about gender did not necessarily drive individual choices – or at least
that they were sublimated by other factors (Orbell et al., 1994).
When humans get too deliberative in analyzing their decision process, they
often fail to accurately reflect on how the decision is made. When they try to
add more options and incorporate more information and data points into their
decisions, the outcomes may become less, rather than more, accurate. A
recent study found that people were able to accurately identify psychopaths
from a 5 second video clip, but that longer clips (more information) did not
improve – and in some case reduced - their accuracy. These participants also
performed comparably well when given only nonverbal cues or only verbal
cues, but more poorly when given both together (Fowler, et al., 2009). The
brain’s simplifying shortcuts are not perfect, and not always economically
rational, but more often than not, in day-to-day decisions, they serve our
interests reasonably well.

#2

Human brains are wired to make decisions about
options and value based on comparisons, not in
absolute terms.
When meeting a stranger, our mental computer is not just uploading and
calculating variables like attractiveness, likeability, and facial expressions in
relation to some absolute criteria or gold standard.
It is appraising
characteristics in relative terms by comparing them to some other person,
option, or mental representation, including our own self. The explicit question
of whether this person is trustworthy is built on an answer to the tacit question
of “relative to what/whom?” This suggests that judgments may change based
on the point of comparison, or frame of reference (Tversky & Kahneman,
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1981). Indeed, this is what researchers consistently find both in consumer
choices and interpersonal appraisals. Comparisons and “framing” guide the
decisions.
Framing and comparison effects also may affect our decisions by evoking
emotions. Here's a classic example: A group of people are given a scenario in
which 600 people are in peril, and they must decide between two courses of
action. Half are given the first frame: “Option A will save 200.” The other half
are give an alternative frame: “Option A will allow 400 people to die.” The
phrasing of the first emphasizes the number of lives saved, while the
alternative frame emphasizes the number of deaths. The actual probabilities
are identical, but more people choose Option A with the first frame than with its
alternative (Kühberger, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
A team of
researchers (De Martino, et al., 2006) used this task in an fMRI study and
found each of the two frames produced different patterns of activation in the
amygdala- a region involved in processing emotional and social information,
and correlated strongly with the chosen course of action, suggesting emotions
were responsible for the framing effect. Interestingly, however, task-related
activity in the brain's higher level thinking and reasoning areas (the prefrontal
cortex) mitigated susceptibility to the framing effect.

#3

Our expectations affect our judgments and outcomes.

Our expectations are often built on a set of tacit or implicit
assumptions, which may not be perfectly rational, but do simplify our
decisions. Studies show, for example, that people report much more pain
relief from taking a pill (placebo) when told it costs $2.50 than when told it
costs only a dime. Why? Generally higher quality items cost more, so
humans carry the implicit notion that “you get what you pay for.”
The effects of our expectations carry over into all kinds of interpersonal
decisions in various ways. For example, if we believe a person does not like
us, we are more inclined to interpret how they look at us or what they say as
being negative or hostile than if the same look or words came from a friend.
This is one example of what decision researchers call confirmatory bias
(Evans, 1989; Rabin & Schrag, 1999). Because the brain is looking for ways to
simplify information and for benchmarks (even if arbitrary) to make
comparisons, what we “find” in our environments tends to be guided by what
we expect to find. This suggests that what we know of people's reputations is
very likely to affect our appraisals of their trustworthiness. Indeed, prior
studies have found that an untrustworthy reputation evokes feelings of distrust
(Deutsch, 1960; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996).
This effect is not always maladaptive or counter-productive. In some
circumstances, it may accelerate our ability to cooperate with others. Humans
generally learn (and acquire social knowledge) about other people over time
as they interact with them, and as they observe them interacting in turn with
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others. Through those observations, humans come to assign a positive or
negative value to the other person (Frith & Singer, 2008). In social dilemma
games with multiple iterations, people not only learn who is a cooperator and
who is a defector, but they also come to like the former and dislike the latter.
Each person's earned status creates a reputation that generalizes to her or his
likeability, which has been shown to shape the perception of their
trustworthiness.

What Happens
in the Brain
When We
Decide
Whether to
Trust?

Social cognitive neuroscientists have used imaging
technologies to examine what happens in the brain when
deciding whether to trust. In most of the studies, the
researchers observe images of brain activity while
participants are engaged in various social dilemma
games. When people engage with cooperators, their
brains show a very different response pattern than when
they engage with defectors. Engaging with a defector, not
surprisingly, tends to activate the brain’s fear center – the amygdala (Singer et
al., 2004a).
The brain also tends to respond somewhat differently based on whether the
other
player’s
cooperation
or
defection
is
intentional or not.
TRUST IN THE BRAIN
One
study,
for
example, compared
brain activity patters
among
persons
engaged
with
intentional
cooperators to those
engaged with nonintentional
cooperators.
Both
kinds of cooperators
behaved the same
way.
The only
difference was in their
perceived intentions.
Many areas of the brain play a role in supporting trust-related
But people’s brains
processes, including the amygdala, prefrontal cortex, anterior
responded differently
cingulate cortex, caudate nucleus, and putamen, pictured here.
to the faces of
The specific functions of each area are described in more detail
intentional than nonwithin this section.
intentional
cooperators. The nature of those differences in brain activation suggests
“subjects were not simply learning which faces were associated with reward.
They were learning whom to trust” (Frith & Frith, 2006, p. 38).
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Confirmatory biases and reputation-based expectations, however, can
sometimes override interpersonal experiential learning. One study used an
iterative trust game in which participants were given a “bio” of their counterpart
player, presenting either a neutral, a praiseworthy, or a morally suspect history
of behavior (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005). In reality – across all three
conditions – the counterpart partners played with a 50% cooperation/
reinforcement schedule.
A part of the brain that guides future decisions based on prior reward feedback
(the striatum) was generally activated in participants when the partner
cooperated or defected, most likely representing reward-based trial and error
learning. But significant activation of the striatum was only observed when
participants thought they were playing with the morally “neutral” partner, not
when playing the morally “good” partner. In fact, as people played the game
through multiple iterations – even though they only achieved “cooperation” half
the time – participants persistently made more risky choices when they thought
the partner had a good moral reputation. Thus, prior expectations about an
individual drove their judgments and in some cases inhibited their ability to
learn from their experiences (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005).
Automatic and Controlled Processing Systems
The human brain has two powerful, but somewhat distinct, systems for
processing information, one of which is more automatic and the other more
controlled (Loewenstein, 2000; Engel & Singer, 2008); both are important for
understanding interpersonal trust (Winston, et al., 2002). The automatic
system operates quickly and spontaneously, taking inputs simultaneously from
multiple sensory channels, while the controlled system operates more slowly
and intentionally to reflectively consider information in a stepwise fashion.

Automatic

Reflexive
X-System
Bottom-Up
Driven my emotion/intuition
Fast operation
Less affected by cognitive load
Efficient under conditions of high physiological
arousal
Sensitive to subliminal influences
Insensitive to nuances and “exceptions to the
rule”
Learns slowly

Controlled

Reflective
C-System
Top-Down
Driven by logic/reason
Slow operation
Affected by cognitive load
Less efficient under conditions of high
physiological arousal
Less susceptible to subliminal influences
Sensitive to nuances and can handle
“exceptions to the rule”
Learns quickly

Different names have been used to refer to these automatic and controlled
systems: Reflexive and Reflective; X-System and C-System (Lieberman,
2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006); bottom-up and top-down (Ochsner, et al.,
2009); and Low Road and High Road (Goleman, 2006). It is a “dual process”
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model (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2003), with the automatic system being
driven more by emotion/intuition and the controlled system more by logic and
reason The dual process model involves more than just two discrete sets of
neural pathways. Both systems are affected by a range of hormones,
neurochemicals, and perceptual factors, like the cognitive biases just
described (Lieberman, 2007). Each system can also affect the other.
Each system has its own strengths and weaknesses and is better suited for
some kinds of tasks or situations more than others. The systems may conflict,
but one is not necessarily the enemy of the other. Research evidence
suggests “decisions dictated by reason are not always good, while decisions
dictated by emotion are not always bad” (Frith & Singer, 2008, p.3884).
Though the automatic system is fast, unaffected by cognitive load, and works
efficiently under conditions of high physiological arousal, it is also more
sensitive to subliminal (outside of conscious awareness) influences, less
sensitive to nuances and “exceptions to the rule,” and is much slower to learn.
The controlled system, though slower, less efficient under high arousal, and
more sensitive to cognitive load, is relatively unaffected by subliminal
influences, learns more quickly, and handles “out of the ordinary” cases very
well (Lieberman, 2007; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006).
There is a dynamic interplay between the automatic and controlled systems
that provides for a balance of influence. Emotions tend to dominate our initial
interpersonal impressions and our interpersonal predictions, so they may have
the home field advantage but they don’t always win. The controlled system
can exercise a top-down override of biases and emotional impulses, so that we
are not entirely subservient to our inclinations, impulses and predispositions
(Rilling et al., 2007). Those top-down controls keep our behavior in line and
permit us to have more harmonious and productive social exchanges (Frith &
Frith, 2006). The rational-emotional balance is a critical component in
regulating our social behavior – likely so with trust as well.
The tension between reason and emotion in decision making is particularly
important to understanding complex social behaviors such as trust (Han et al.,
2009). Trust researchers have acknowledged for years that the rational and
emotional aspects of trust often work together. Nearly 25 years ago, it was
observed that “trusting behavior may be motivated primarily by strong positive
affect for the object of trust or by 'good rational reasons' why the object of trust
merits trust, or, more usually, some combination of both. Trust in everyday life
is a mix of feeling and rational thinking" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985, p. 972).

Deciding in
Social Contexts

The human brain and physiology are known to operate
somewhat differently in social (interpersonal) than in nonsocial contexts. In interpersonal trust transactions,
humans attempt to read what the other person is trying to convey
(communicative intent), while attempting to convey a trustworthy impression
(Berg et al., 1995). This effect does not occur, however, when they are
interacting with a computer (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al. 2004) or when
outcomes are determined by an algorithm (for example, in an automated trust
game) (Singer et al. 2004). During an interpersonal trust game, for example,
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each player is simultaneously signaling and assessing trustworthiness (KingCasas et al., 2005). In our trust appraisals, to form expectations regarding
another person’s behavior, we must be able to understand the other’s
perspective through the lens of their own beliefs, intentions, and emotions.
This typically occurs through a mix of sensory inputs and social cognitive
processes, which appear to be unique to social/interpersonal interactions
(McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004).
Recent research suggests that humans use the same specific neural networks
to process others’ mental and emotional states as when we are experiencing
those states ourselves (Jackson et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2007). So, for
example, if an individual is watching another person being afraid and trying to
understand what he/she is feeling and experiencing, that individual will activate
many of the same brain areas and pathways as if they were being directly
frightened (Frith & Singer, 2008). The degree of activation, however, may
depend on a variety of social factors, such as the individual’s general
attitudes/feelings toward the other person and the extent to which they can
identify with the other person.
A variety of automatic and controlled processes are responsible both for our
capacity to understand thoughts and feelings from another’s perspective and
for these parallel or “shared” patterns of neural activity. At the most
fundamental, biological level, there is accumulating evidence that our own
neural systems detect and mimic what we observe in others. A recently
popular hypothesis is that this is the effect of a mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti
and Craighero, 2004).

Mirror
Neurons

It is clear that the human brain is sensitive to
social/interpersonal transactions. A trustor’s brain is
affected by the mere presence of the potential trustee.
The resulting brain activity will affect whether the individual decides to trust the
other. How do these socially-activated brain changes occur? One possible
mechanism is through mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are a set of neurons
that respond both when an individual performs a goal-directed action, and
when observing another individual performing the same action. Neural
pathways in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), ventral premotor cortex, inferior
parietal cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) seem to be
particularly implicated in this type of activity (Iacoboni and Daprettto, 2006;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). These neurons are believed to be crucial to
human and non-human primate abilities to imitate others. Some suggest that
they are also responsible for social contagion effects (such as yawn contagion)
that occur when others’ feeling states, facial expressions and body postures
cause our bodies to respond accordingly (Frith & Frith, 2006).
Another revelation showing that these mirror systems are socially sensitive,
not just reflexive, is that the extent of our mirror activation seems to depend on
the degree of social engagement. If a person moves while making eye contact
with an observer, the observer will exhibit much stronger neural activation than
if the actor was facing away from him (Kilner et al. 2006). Mirror neuron activity
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has primarily been studied in the context of intentional imitation of goal
directed action. Very little data exist on the relationship between mirror
neurons and nonverbal communication, most of which appears to be
unconscious and non-cognitive.

Empathy

Humans (and their brains) – as noted in prior research
(see p. 29) - not only respond to others’ behavior, but also
to their intentions. Empathic processes are a key part of how people assess
others’ intentions. These are the processes that allow us to understand and
even share others’ emotional and feeling states (de Vignemont & Singer,
2006). Empathy occurs at an intermediate level on the automatic-controlled
continuum. Whereas social contagion effects occur unconsciously, when we
empathize we are aware that our reactions and feeling states are prompted by
someone else’s reactions and experiences (Lamm, et al., 2008). We are –
with awareness - viewing a situation from another person’s perspective. Our
empathic responses are also socially sensitive. The nature and extent of their
activation can vary according to nature of the relationship, the situation, and
how we perceive the other person (Akitsuki & Decety 2009). Having a strong
emotional bond with the other person may enhance our empathic activation
(Singer et al. 2004a), but if we perceive the other person as being unfair or
somehow deserving of pain or punishment, we may experience much less
empathic activation (Lamm, et al. 2007; Singer, et al.,2006). The degree of
empathic response can also be modulated by the intensity of the stimulus we
are observing (Avenanti et al. 2006).

Mentalizing

Mentalizing (also called Theory of Mind) invokes the very
conscious and deliberate processes we use to infer or
predict what others are thinking and feeling (Frith & Singer, 2008). It’s what
happens when we are thinking about what someone else may be thinking. We
know only a little from social neuroscience research about this process, and
mostly in an indirect way. In these studies, people are rarely interacting with
another person. Instead, they are typically shown a picture or story and asked
to relate what the subject might be thinking or feeling (Hampton et al., 2008).
These non-social actions are called “offline” tasks. Brain imaging studies of
mentalizing activity report fairly consistent findings, including – (a) activation of
the pSTS, an area at the bottom and rear of the brain known to be active when
we are evaluating others, and also associated with altruism and ethical/moral
decision making, and (b) activity in the medial (referring to the area closest to
the body’s centerline) prefrontal cortex (mPFC), an area in the front of the
brain believed to help us discern the meaning of our emotions and experiences
(Frith and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004). In social dilemma game studies
where participants are assigned either to play against a person or a computer,
the mPFC is activated during inter-person play, but not during personcomputer interaction (McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004).
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Detecting
Signals of Trust
in the Brain

Two of the most common contemporary methods for
measuring the neural basis of psychological processes
such as trust are EEG and fMRI. EEG measures changes
in electrical brain currents that occur when large groups of
neurons in the outermost layer of the brain, the cortex, fire simultaneously.
These changes are measured using electrodes placed on the surface of the
scalp and face. Because EEG picks up electrical signals, it is a fairly direct and
“real-time” measure of brain activity. The signals are detected very near the
time when the activity occurs. Because each EEG electrode covers a zone,
however, it is not very precise in pinpointing highly focalized areas of activity.
EEG and fMRI as Measures of Trust

The powerful magnetic field in fMRI is
used to detect changes in the ratio of
oxygenated
to
deoxygenated
hemoglobin in the brain’s blood flow.
This ratio is known as a bloodoxygenated level dependent (BOLD)
response. Oxygenated blood tends to
flow into areas of the brain that are
active, so changes in this oxygenation
ratio correlate with changes in the
surrounding level of neural activity.
Unlike EEG, it does not measure
neural firings directly. fMRI is much better than EEG at isolating small areas of
signal activity, but – because it is only measuring changes in oxygenated blood
flow, and not neural electrical signals - it is also a more indirect, and somewhat
delayed measure of brain activity. EEG measures neural firings as they occur,
but changes in blood flow take some time, perhaps even several seconds,
after the neural response. fMRI is better than EEG at pinpointing location, but
worse at pinpointing the timing of neural activity. The two methods can be
combined, but doing both simultaneously is technically and computationally
demanding (Debener & Herrmann, 2008; Hermann and Debener, 2008;
Moosman, et al., 2008; Varios et al., 2006) and doing them sequentially
introduces variability that could confound the results.
Several fMRI studies have identified patterns of BOLD response during games
of trust and during judgments of trustworthiness based on facial expressions.
Commonly activated brain areas include: the amygdala, anterior medial
prefrontal cortex, paracingulate cortex, insula, ventral tegmental area, septal
area, fusiform gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, and orbitofrontal cortex.
Technical measurement aside, most neuroimaging and neurophysiological
studies of trust to date have very little conceptual or theoretical foundation
(some do not even define trust at all) and are profoundly lacking in ecological
validity. They use offline tasks or contrived social dilemma games, in which
trust is inferred from cooperative behavior in a reciprocal exchange. Because
of the constraints of cumbersome technology, nearly all are done in laboratory
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environments. Even if the neural measures were direct and highly precise, it is
not at all clear that trust is what is causing the neural activation.
Given that fMRI research thus far has not been able to identify consistent and
specific signals for even basic emotions, (Barrett and Wagner, 2006) it should
not be surprising that anything like a “trust center” in the brain” (if one exists)
has eluded detection. Most neurophysiology and neuroscience techniques
used in the study of trust provide only partial insight into the system as a
whole. It is possible that techniques like psychoneuropharmacology and
behavioral genetics, which address cognition and behavior at a systemic level,
might hold promise in the investigation of large scale neural system
interactions that are key to the development and maintenance of trust.

Neurochemicals
& Trust

Oxytocin

Oxytocin (OT) is a neurochemical – technically a
“neuropeptide hormone” - that has received a flood of popular attention over
the past several years. It has even been hyperbolically described as the “trust
hormone.” OT is a naturally occurring neuropeptide, found in most mammals,
and in humans is synthesized in the hypothalamus (a part of the brain that
connects the nervous and endocrine systems, serving as a control center for
hormones and regulating behavioral circadian rhythms/patterns). OT is
implicated in a diverse array of physiological and psychological processes
including birthing, lactation, sexual arousal, blood pressure, anxiety, and social
behaviors (Gimpl & Fahrenholz, 2001; Barberis & Tribollet, 1996). OT appears
to facilitate the forming of social bonds and attachments (Carter, 1998; Insel &
Young, 2001); to speed the healing of physical wounds; to enhance positive
communications and perceived social support (Gouin, et al., 2010), and to
mitigate the stress-response effects of social anxiety and social stressors
(Heinrichs et al, 2003).
In other experiments, studies have shown that administering OT (intra-nasally)
can artificially increase its levels in the body, leading to increases in
cooperative and trust-like behaviors (Baumgartner, et al., 2008; Kosfeld et al.,
2005). Professor Ernst Fehr (Fehr, et al., 2005; Fehr, 2009, 2008) from the
University of Zurich and Dr. Paul Zak (2008, 2007, 2005), director of the
Center for Neuroeconomics Studies at Claremont Graduate University, have
been at the center of efforts to explore the role of OT in interpersonal trust and
relationships. In previous experiments using the Trust Game, researchers
found that OT levels naturally and consistently rise in the receiving player who
was given part of the endowment from the first player. OT’s role in this signal
of being trusted, therefore, was confirmed when researchers administered
doses of OT, and players tended to show more reciprocity in their game
behavior; that is, they were both more likely to give money back and to return a
greater amount of their benefit to the other player. With the boost of OT,
reciprocity and generosity increases, even when risk-taking itself (e.g., playing
“against the odds” in a gambling or probability task) does not change,
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suggesting OT’s effects are very specific and sensitive to the social context
(Kosfeld et al., 2005).
Following up on these findings,
Professor Gregor Domes from the
University of Zurich led a study
(Domes et al., 2007b) exploring
whether and how OT might affect a
person’s ability to infer another’s
internal state. Recall, these tasks
generally fall into the category of
mentalizing or Theory of Mind.
Though some colloquially refer to
this as “mind reading,” that might
overstate the process a bit.
Reading others, however, is a
regular and essential part of
human
social
engagement
generally, and because trust
judgments are conditioned on our
expectations of how others will
behave, trying to gauge the
motivations and intentions of
others is likely to be a part of
assessing whom to trust, with
what, to what degree, and under
what conditions. Therefore, the
fact that OT seems to improve the
accuracy of this assessment is of
particular
interest,
and
was
investigated further in a follow-on
experiment.

READING THE MIND IN THE EYES
TEST STIMULI

Baron-Cohen S. et al. (2001)

Domes and his colleagues used the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test”
(RMET; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) in a rigorous double-blind, placebocontrolled experiment. RMET was originally developed by researchers in the
1990s to measure impairments in social mentalizing functions among people
with autism spectrum disorders. RMET participants view a series of
photographs, each depicting the area around a person’s eyes, and are asked
to choose from a list of two to four words which best characterizes what the
pictured person is thinking and feeling (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1997, 2001). The
photos vary somewhat in their level of difficulty. Domes and colleagues found
that participants given intranasal OT performed significantly better on the
RMET than those given the placebo, and that the difference was particularly
apparent in the more complex or challenging inferences – more evidence of
OT’s social specificity (Domes et al., 2007b).
In a separate set of studies by the same researchers, subjects viewed
snapshots of faces displaying angry, fearful, happy or neutral expressions.
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Males given OT showed a blunted response of the amygdala to anger, fear,
and happiness, compared to placebo-treated males (Domes et al., 2007b). In
another study, females were tested using the same pictures and an increase in
amygdala activation was seen in the OT-treated females, but only when shown
the fearful faces (Domes et al., 2010). These results further demonstrate the
role of OT in processing emotional and social stimuli, but also the important
interactions it may have with other neurochemicals, such as sex hormones,
and how this may modulate neurophysiology and behavior.
Another intriguing aspect of OT studies in human interaction is that there is a
distinct subgroup of people – approximately 2% of their study participants –
who almost never reciprocate and seem more impervious to OT’s socially
facilitating effects. Some have likened this group to “psychopaths” who tend to
show callous, unemotional disregard for other people. Researchers suggest
that most people reciprocate conditionally – when the other player sends them
more money, they return more money. But these hardcore non-reciprocators
don’t behave that way. One might be inclined to think that perhaps, their
brains - unlike most - aren’t releasing OT when they initially receive the money.
Surprisingly, they find quite the opposite.
OT’s normal release pattern is in tightly regulated bursts. When the brain
perceives a social cue of trust (like being given money in the Trust Game), its
typical pattern is to quickly switch on OT production to release the chemical,
then to quickly switch off again. In the non-reciprocators, the automatic “off
switch” doesn’t engage and they wind up with very high levels of peripheral
OT. Yet they don’t respond to OT like the others. It doesn’t increase their
reciprocity and cooperative behavior. This has led scientists to wonder if
perhaps the glitch among the hardcore non-reciprocators lies in their OT
receptors, which may be abnormally upregulated or downregulated in specific
regions of the brain or have structural or functional problems such that OT
does not appropriately bind to the receptor. Additional research is needed to
understand the effect of individual differences in the oxytocinergic system on
social decision-making processes.
Vasopressin
Vasopressin is a peptide hormone with a chemical structure very similar to that
of OT, and also synthesized primarily in the hypothalamus (Skuse and
Gallagher, 2009). Vasopressin expression is modulated by genetic
mechanisms on the X- or Y-chromosomes and may promote somewhat
different responses in men than in women. Like most hormones and
neurochemicals, vasopressin has multiple effects and functions. Though it
acts as an antidiuretic, and is involved in regulating blood pressure, it has also
been associated with male-typical social behaviors, including aggression, pair
bonding, scent marking, and courtship (Heinrichs et al., 2009). Centrally active
vasopressin seems generally to be associated with increased vigilance,
anxiety, arousal, and activation. Interestingly, increases in OT usually
suppress vasopressin.
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Dopamine
Dopamine (DA) is one of the most important neurochemicals in the brain’s
reward system (Badgaiyan, et al., 2009). The dopaminergic system modulates
emotion – such as fear – and regulates the brain’s perceptions of reward,
particularly in social behavior. DA serves many other functions as well from
pleasure seeking to detecting disruptive or disturbing environmental changes,
and even selective information processing (Pani, Porcella, & Gassa, 2000).
Dopamine has somewhat different effects when it is distributed in different
areas of the brain. Its circuits in the upper (dorsal) striatum, which includes the
caudate nucleus and putamen, for example, can help us to monitor the
outcomes of our actions in order to facilitate reward-based learning.
Dopaminergic circuits in the lower (ventral) striatum can help anticipate or
predict whether reward will result from a future action. In the case of
interpersonal trust, fear is often prompted by a belief or feeling that the other
person will either act against our expectations, against our interests, or both.
Reward, on the other hand, occurs when our positive expectations about the
other’s behavior are met. In that way, Dopamine contributes physiologically to
our decisions about when, with whom, and under what circumstances we
should be vulnerable to another, and helps us to learn from our trust
experiences and our assessments of others’ trustworthiness.

Brain
Structures &
Systems of
Trust

The striatum

The striatum – which includes the
caudate nucleus, putamen,
and nucleus accumbens–
plays a major role in the brain’s reward
system. This is primarily because of its role in
regulating dopamine (DA), known to be a key
chemical in the reward pathway. Research
studies have found that engaging in cooperative (or
sometimes “justified” punishing) behavior stimulates
activity in the striatum (DeQuervain, 2004; Rilling et al.,
2004). Conversely, activation in the striatum tends to precipitate
cooperative behaviors (Caldu & Dreher, 2007), possibly in
anticipation of a reward. Cooperation occurs when two or more people act
toward a mutually beneficial outcome. Rationally, cooperation only makes
sense when it is reciprocated. So, to use cooperation adaptively in situations
of interpersonal trust, people need to be able to learn and to anticipate when
they should and should not do it. Dopamine pathways in the striatum help to
regulate those signals and to facilitate adaptive learning about when to trust.
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The amygdala
The amygdala was once thought to be the brain’s
center for fear-based emotional expression.
Accumulating evidence supports a more general
role for the amygdala in detecting threat and
signaling reward, fear, and emotionally-laden
social cues, and does so both for conscious,
cognitively driven emotional responses and for
unconscious and automatic responses like those of
the autonomic nervous system (Adolphs, et al., 1998;
Adolphs, 2008; Pessoa, 2008). The amygdala is a key
structure for context conditioning – an organism’s ability to
locate and detect environments where reward has previously been
or is
likely to be found, and to avoid those without reward or where danger may be
present (Le Doux, 2003). Studies using positron emission tomography (PET)
and fMRI clearly show involvement of the amygdala in recognizing emotional
facial expression, and suggest it may be important for social cognition as well
(Kandel, et al., 1991). People decide to trust (or not) based on whether the
other person’s anticipated actions represent a potential threat or a potential
reward (they will cooperate and behave as expected). The amygdala acts
somewhat like a “social sonar” for interpersonal cues, helping us anticipate
how the other person is likely to act.
The prefrontal cortex (PFC)
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is the brain’s goaldirecting cognitive control center. The PFC can
be subdivided into three major regions: orbital,
medial, and lateral. The orbital and medial
regions are largely involved in emotional
behavior, and the lateral region provides the
cognitive support to regulate speech, reasoning,
and the sequencing of behavior (Fuster, 2001). A
robust and consistent finding is that the medial prefrontal
areas are activated in humans when they are evaluating social
norms and engaged in mentalizing tasks, particularly assessing another
person's essential character or enduring traits (as opposed to what the person
is imminently intending to do) (Frith & Frith 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009). It
may also help to maintain a self-other distinction while facilitating our ability to
relate to an experience or situation from another person's perspective (Elliott,
et al., 2000). The PFC handles working memory and behavioral rules, which it
synthesizes with information from all the forebrain systems to choose an
appropriate course of action (Blumenfeld & Ranganath, 2007). The PFC helps
us to organize and evaluate the neurochemical signals (and other conscious
social cues) of fear, threat, or reward and to analyze the situation from the
other’s perspective to decide whether acting on trust is warranted in a
particular situation.
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The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) located on the
orbital surface of the frontal lobe, receives
inputs from various sensory regions and from
subcortical structures, such as the amygdala
(Elliott, et al., 2003). The OFC is actively
engaged in regulating social behavior,
especially in reasoning and making decisions and
choosing responses under conditions of
uncertainty (Elliott, et al., 2003). The OFC is
simultaneously active with the amygdala, in monitoring and
storing information about reward conditions and values,
especially in iterative transactions (Elliott, et al., 2000). It is activated both with
intentional and unintentional (embarrassing) social norm violations (Berthoz, et
al., 2002). It is also responsive to angry faces (Elliott, et al., 2000) and is likely
part of a system that responds to others’ anger and aversive reactions. So, the
OFC – like the PFC –also supports our reasoning/decision-making about trust,
but its effect is strongest when the situation is ambiguous, and it relies heavily
on emotion-related signals for the amygdala.

The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is part of the
brain’s executive control system, responsible in
part for resolving conflicting information such
as when people are sending “mixed signals.”
Functional neuroimaging studies have shown
ACC activity during tasks that engage
selective and sustained attention, working
memory,
language
generation,
conflict
monitoring, and controlled information
processing (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al.,
1998; Cohen & Servan-Schrieber, 1992; Posner et al, 2006;
Raichle, 2003). The ACC is also anatomically connected to limbic
(controlling emotion) and motor (controlling movement) cortical structures.
Humans’ ability to infer another person’s mental states – sometimes called
mentalizing - seems to rely on activation of the ACC, as well as medial
prefrontal areas. It may also be a hub of emotional and cognitive decision
inputs for choosing how to behave in ambiguous or uncertain circumstances –
then storing that learning for future reference. Like other frontal areas of the
brain, the ACC supports our decisions about interpersonal trust by controlling
the flow of emotional and informational inputs for the decision, and by
prompting a particular course of action.

40

T H E

S C I E N C E

O F

I N T E R P E R S O N A L

T R U S T

Relationship & Behaviors
Trust is affected not only by the trustor’s internal decision processes and
appraisal of the trustee, but also by the social and contextual elements of the
relationship and the parties’ behaviors as they interact. These elements can
shape the relevance and amplitude of signals and cues that human use to
others’ trustworthiness, with obvious implications when trying to understand
and quantify different kinds of trust. In this section, we review some of the
latest evidence related to the role of relationships and behaviors in terms of
how another is determined to be trustworthy and thus who trusts whom.

Contextual
Norms

Interpersonal trust, as we noted, is theoretically rooted in
economic principles of social exchange, but in reality,
people often do not follow the economically optimal course
of action. Researchers suggest one reason for this is that different norms of
social behavior apply in different relational contexts – what some refer to as
communal and exchange norms (Clark & Mills, 1993; Mills & Clark, 1994). The
economic model is based on market or exchange-based norms where goods
or services are ascribed some specific value and are paid for or reciprocally
exchanged in direct proportion to their worth.
When you go to the convenience store to get a gallon of milk, the expectation
is that you will pay the marked price to the cashier, and complete the
transaction. If you advertise in the newspaper to trade some item or service
for another, you will seek and expect to acquire something of comparable
value to what you are offering. The other party will too. Those are
fundamental shared assumptions in an exchange relationship, because –
according to a common Euro-American paradigm - “it’s just business.” This of
course is an idealized version of this kind of exchange, and rarely – if ever –
reflects reality. Even in business, we develop relationships with owners,
employees, and customers; we come to trust certain people and stores over
others; and we select different partners with whom to do business for many
reasons, some of which are not purely exchange-based, but are also related to
the fact that we trust them as people. However, there is still the expectation
that interpersonal trust will only get you so far in business.
On the other hand, with family and friends – what Clark and Mills (1993) call
communal relationships – the parties’ motivations and expectations for
exchange are very different. In communal relationships exchanges of goods
and services are typically motivated by a caring emotional bond with the other
person and a desire to help them or serve their interests. There is no general
concern about comparable exchange; in fact, the social relationship is better
served if benefits exchanged are not exclusively quid pro quo.
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Contextual Norms in Action
An interesting parallel exists with individuals or groups aiming to cultivate trust.
Individual motivations for providing information to a competitor or adversary
often vary in different people or even in the same person over time.
Individuals who are effective trustors try to track how these motivations evolve.
At times, a potential trustee may be “all business” about a particular tasking,
but at other times may be reflecting more on how what (s)he is doing might be
serving some cause or greater good, and – not uncommonly – some
transactions heavily leverage the social capital that exists in the relationship
between the trustor and trustee. If trustors are out of synch with the trustee’s
expectations, they risk damaging the relationship and potentially alienating the
potential or former trustee, when in fact they may be only vulnerable if they are
unable to accurately detect any change in the trustee’s trustworthiness.

In Group /
Out Group
Status

More than half a century ago, Gordon Allport (1954)
discussed the central importance of ingroup - outgroup
status on prejudice and interpersonal perceptions. A
substantial body of social psychological research shows
consistently that people rate fellow ingroup members much more positively
than outgroup members across a wide range of social attributes, including
trustworthiness (Brewer, 1996; Turner, 1987). Perhaps this predisposition to
ingroup affinity is an evolutionary adaptation (Brewer, 1999). Interdependence
– and therefore cooperation – is a necessary condition for the long-term
survival of the human species, but indiscriminate trust, as an individual
strategy, is maladaptive. In this way, “ingroups can be defined as bounded
communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence
and cooperation” (Brewer, 1999, p. 433).
Within the ingroup there exists a depersonalized bond of trust that extends to
all its members; one that is not contingent on other social knowledge or
affective connections between individual parties. Group membership itself
carries the imprimatur of trustworthiness. Some have referred to this as a form
of “Category-based trust” (Kramer, 1999) and there is some evidence, as we
have seen, that such a category-based trust can help reduce cognitive load in
humans by providing mental shortcuts: you can trust person X because they
are part of group Y.
Neuroscientific studies show that as people come to identify with an ingroup
(what some would call identification-based trust [IBT, see page 9 for more
discussion on IBT]), they increasingly process what happens to fellow
members as though they were experiencing it themselves, down to the neural
level (Damasio, Damasio, Immordino-Yang, and McColl, 2009). There are
even observable responses, like facial expressions, that may signal that kind
of emotional identification (Decety & Yamada, 2009). Having a general IBT
with ingroup members predisposes us to perceive them more positively and to
accord them preference over outgroup members. This supports the “social
intuitionist” model of morality, which argues that moral judgment is as much of
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a social process as it is an individual “in one’s own head” decision (Greene, et
al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt & Bjorkland, 2007; Young & Koenigs,
2007).
Like other cognitive biases discussed earlier, knowing another person’s group
status becomes a mental/emotional shortcut, at least to determine the initial or
baseline level of trust. Initial levels of trust will almost always be higher for
ingroup members and lower for outgroup members. Conversely, levels of
distrust will almost always be initially higher for outgroup members and low for
ingroup members (Kramer, 1999b; Turner, 1987; Williams, 2001). Perhaps we
interpret outgroup status as indicating that the others’ values are different than
our own, since we know that perceptions of value incongruence can evoke
distrust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Factors that might mitigate ingroup-outgroup
prejudice have been studied extensively. Some of the strategies that seem to
reduce those biases most effectively are: having extended contact between
ingroup and outgroup members (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner, Hewstone,
& Voci, 2007); redefining social categories to emphasize a common goal or
identity between ingroup and outgroup members (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000);
and emphasizing similarities between the groups (Gabarrot, et al., 2009).

Relational
Behaviors

In a relational context – as opposed to a single transaction
– interpersonal trust is profoundly affected by the
behaviors and interactions between the parties over time.
This means trust is a dynamic variable. Even in a behavioral economic
paradigm, when our trust is honored with cooperation, we count that as a
reward or positive reinforcement, increasing the likelihood and possibly
breadth of trust in future transactions. In essence, we learn about others’
trustworthiness by their actions. When our trust is violated, however, by the
other party’s defection or betrayal, it is a negative response (punishment) that
not only makes future trust less likely, but also may positively reinforce distrust
in that person (Jones and George, 1998).
Social closeness is another determinant of trustworthy behavior. Cooperation
tends to increase in closer relationships (Glaeser, et al., 2000; Orbell, van de
Kragt, & Dawes, 1988; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998; Buchan, Croson, & Dawes,
2002), leading some to the conclusion that social distance is the first
determinant of trust (Macy & Skvoretz, 1998). Perhaps this effect is based, in
part, on having more experience with the other person in a greater number of
transactions across different contexts, which might increase our confidence in
predictions or expectations about the other person’s future action (Sitkin and
Roth, 1993). This experiential calculus is probably a reasonable basis for trust
decisions, since past trusting behaviors – much more than trust attitudes - are
known to predict people’s future trust behavior (Glaeser, et al., 2000).
Peripheral indices of social distance and self-other similarity, however, also
appear to affect trust decisions. Persons perceived as having high status
(e.g., family status, social skill, charisma) tend to garner greater trust (more
cooperation, fewer defections) from others, while persons who are
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demographically different – for example, of a different race or nationality – tend
to exhibit less trustworthy behavior (more defections) with one another
(Glaeser, et al., 2000).
Trust’s effect is reciprocal. Our trust in other people tends to increase as we
come to believe that they increasingly trust us. The converse also appears to
be true with distrust (Butler, 1983), creating something of a positive-feedback
cycle for trust and distrust. Researchers have replicated this dynamic both in
organizational and interpersonal contexts.
When managers increase
employee monitoring, it tends to make workers distrustful toward management
(Cialdini, 1996; Kruglanski 1970). Interestingly, although not conclusive, some
evidence suggests that in interpersonal encounters persons who tend to be
more trusting of others, tend to be more trustworthy themselves (Glaeser, et
al., 2000) – though the converse might not always be true. However, this
notion can be taken to extremes in some cases, such as in people with
Williams Syndrome, a rare, pathological condition that, according to several
reports, makes people “biologically incapable of not trusting people,” to include
total strangers. These people are themselves consequently untrustworthy
since they are unable to take appropriate caution in situations in which most
neurotypical humans would be at least slower to trust others.
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4
Section

Individual and CrossCultural Differences
A variety of individual and cultural differences can influence the
type of trust generated within different contexts, the starting point
or baseline level of trust, and the specific behavioral expression of
trust. In some cases, there are clear biological underpinnings to these
differences, and in others, the physiological mechanism(s) remains
unknown. Further, many cultures will have very different
assumptions about whom to trust, and to what extent.

1. Baseline trust or “trust propensity” (also known as “generalized trust”
e.g., whether someone tends to assume that most people are
trustworthy or that most people cannot be trusted) varies substantially
from person to person, and is affected by a variety of influences,
including past experience, genetic predisposition, and personality
characteristics.
2. In extreme cases, like criminals or individuals with antisocial personality
disorders, there are well-documented differences in both the structure
and function of specific brain regions that are likely involved in forming
trust.
3. Even very small genetic differences can have substantial impacts on
physiology and behavior, which – while far from conclusive – may
explain some variance in people’s trust and trustworthiness. While a
single “trust gene” has not been identified, the study of disorders that
impair social interactions has identified several genes that appear to be
linked to certain trust-related processes.
4. In much the same way that cultural norms affect interpersonal
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communication, they can also affect perceptions of normative or
expected trust behaviors. While a majority of trust research to date has
been conducted with European and American participants, these
studies are increasingly being extended to non-Western cultures.
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, while the neurobiology of trust itself may be
universal to most humans, the assumptions of who and what to trust
vary among different groups and cultures. Indeed, many findings point
to cultural differences in the propensity to trust others and to
reciprocate when an individual behaves in a manner indicating trust.

T

rust’s intense complexity is compounded by the different ways in which
it operates for different people or groups of people. Just as people vary
in their general personality traits – for reasons that have biological,
psychological, and social underpinnings – they also vary in their
baseline trust or general assumptions about others’ trustworthiness. Likewise,
an individual’s personality and psychological behavior may affect different
people in different ways. Finally, culture and patterns of socialization can affect
both our predispositions to trust as well as how we process social/emotional
information related to trust.
If the communities seeking to understand trust and scientists studying trust are
to move toward an integrated biopsychosocial understanding of how
interpersonal trust works for whom and under what circumstances, discerning
systematic differences occurring across individuals and across groups will be
critical.

Interindividual Differences
Individuals vary considerably in their propensity to trust based on whether they
view “most people” as being reliable (or not) and in their willingness to depend
on them (or not) (McKnight & Cervaney 2001, 2002). Some begin each
interpersonal encounter with the assumption that others are usually
competent, benevolent, honest/ethical, and predictable; that is, that they are
trustworthy. Others – often generalizing from past experiences of betrayal adopt the opposite assumptions.
This is the domain of individual differences known as trust propensity (Kramer,
1999; McKnight et al., 1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Rotter, 1967). In the literature
on organizational behavior, this is sometimes called “dispositional trust,” and in
other social science literature is referred to as “generalized social trust,” “thin
trust,” or “impersonal trust” (Delhey & Newton, 2003; 2005). It is not a trust
conditioned on any specific cognitive or affective appraisal of another person’s
individual characteristics, which is sometimes called “particularized trust,” or
“strategic trust.” Trust propensity is the individual’s default or starting point for
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trust in nearly all interpersonal encounters. It is most often measured in largescale social surveys by using a single “Generalized Trust Question” (GTQ) – a
forced-choice item in which respondents either endorse the statement that: “in
general, most people can be trusted” (these are called the trusters) or the
statement “you can't be too careful in dealing with people.” Reasonable
concerns have been raised, however, about whether the traditional GTQ
measure might confound the concepts of trust and caution (Miller & Mitamura,
2003).
Trust propensity is probably not so much a distinct personality trait as it is a
behavioral tendency driven by a collection of traits – some temperamental,
others shaped by experiences – that predispose people to be more or less
willing to be vulnerable to others (as discussed below, for example, some
research suggests that generalized trust is positively associated with I.Q, see
Sturgis, 2009; Haier, 2009). People can be trusting or distrustful in different
ways. Some evidence suggests, however, at a neural level, trust propensity
(unconditional trust) may operate though a different set of processes than
conditional or situation-specific trust. In one neuroimaging study, for example,
individuals who made choices consistent with unconditional trust showed
selective activation of a brain region associated with social attachment (i.e.,
septal area), whereas subjects who demonstrated conditional trust were seen
to have differential activity of an area known to identify and evaluate rewards
(i.e., ventral tegmental area) (Krueger, et al., 2007).
Personality factors and traits may comprise the primary internally-driven
domain of individual differences. Interindividual differences in personality traits
are reflected both in phenotypic variance, their characteristic patterns of
cognition, affect and behavior, and in biotypical variance, underlying
physiological or biological differences. Each type of interindividual variance
affects the other (Stemmler & Wacker, 2009). A biopsychosocial approach to
personality might define it as “a dynamic organization, inside the person, of
psychophysical systems that create the person’s characteristic patterns of
behavior, thoughts, and feelings” (Carver & Scheier, 2004, p. 5).
“on a very general level, sources of individual differences in manifest
variables are biological (Canli, 2006). These sources comprise the
genotype and the individual structure and function of the body’s organs, in
particular the brain. Recent research has reported intriguing findings, for
example, personality correlates of genetic polymorphisms (e.g., Ebstein,
2006) or of brain structure (e.g., Wright et al., 2006) and function (e.g.,
O'Gorman et al., 2006). Thus, a portion of the interindividual variance in
manifest variables (phenotypical variance) is attributable to biotypical
variance” (Stemmler & Wacker, 2009, pp.3-4).
Research has linked trust propensity to other well-established personality
traits. Within the well-established Five Factor Model of personality (which
includes Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness,
and Conscientiousness), the trait of agreeableness has shown a particularly
strong and positive association with predisposition to trust others (Mooradian
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et al., 2006).
This finding harmonizes with earlier studies showing
interindividual variance in predispositions toward competitive versus
cooperative behavior. Those who are more competitively oriented were more
likely to view others as being untrustworthy and to behave toward them
accordingly (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).
Researchers tend to find higher levels of trust propensity (generalized social
trust) among persons with better jobs and with higher levels of education and
income. A recent study followed two British birth cohorts (comprising more
than 35,000 people) over several decades and found that intelligence
(measured around age 10) predicted generalized trust in later adulthood,
lending support to Yamagishi’s (2001) hypothesis about a link between trust
and IQ. The essence of this theory, which Yamagishi developed from
observing behavioral game performance, is that “socially astute individuals are
better able to accurately detect signs of (un)trustworthiness in social and
economic interactions. This means that, throughout life, they do not suffer the
costs of betrayal so frequently, as they are less inclined to place their trust in
those who are unlikely to honour it” (Sturgis, et al., 2009, p.8). It is possible
that appropriately gauged interpersonal trust is part of the complex of what
makes smart people successful (Haier, 2009).
Interpersonal suspiciousness, on the other hand, has been associated with
predispositions to distrust since some of Morton Deustch’s (1958) earliest
writings on trust-related phenomena, emphasizing its effects on the cognitive
dimensions of trust. Persons who are high in suspiciousness tend to be more
self-conscious than others, and tend both to overestimate and to selectively
attend to negative aspects of interpersonal interactions (Kaney, et al., 1997;
Lee & Won, 1998; Marchand & Vonk, 2005) –factors likely to enhance the
intensity of their distrust, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts and
highlighting the costs of inappropriate distrust in certain situations. Research
also has shown that persons with low trust propensity have higher rates of
divorce, unemployment, discrimination, and poorer general health (Sturgis, et
al., 2009).
Interindividual variance in trust-related processes and characteristics applies
not only to self-report or phenotypic measures but also extends to
physiological and neuroimaging measures as well. “Individual differences
prevail in physiological recordings just as they do in behavior, thoughts, and
feelings, even if individuals are in the same situation” (Stemmler & Wacker,
2009, p. 3). The measured variation may be caused by interindividual
differences in brain structure, neural function, and perhaps even genetic
predisposition, and recent research in epigenetics (that is, the study of the
ways that experience can literally cause genes to be expressed or silenced)
suggests that this mechanism may be more at work than previously
appreciated.

Structural
Differences

An earlier section on determinants of trust in the trustor
described different brain areas and mechanisms involved
in an individual’s trust-related appraisals, responses and
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decisions. A number of studies have found – with some consistency - that the
brains of people who exhibit persistent antisocial and interpersonally
transgressive behavior and who show little empathy or emotional regard for
others are structurally different than brains of normal controls (Raine, 2008).
Those structural differences tend to be most pronounced in areas of the brain
associated with processing of social/emotional information and regulatory
functions, which also happen to be the areas integral to trust-related
processes.
Among criminal offenders, the prefrontal cortices – centers for regulating
behavior and controlling emotion - tend to be smaller and to have less grey
matter (fewer neurons). Their amygdalae (fear centers) tend to be smaller,
and the hippocampus (which regulates conditioning and learning) is much
more likely to be asymmetrical – at least among the “unsuccessful” ones who
get caught- with the right side being larger than the left. The corpus callosum a nerve fiber bundle that connects the brain’s left and right hemispheres –
tends to be larger but thinner than normal; a structural abnormality that may
accelerate transmission between the hemispheres, but which is also
associated with diminished interpersonal emotional responsiveness, resulting
in diminished feelings of social attachment or of remorse (Patrick, 2007; Raine,
2008; Raine & Yang, 2006).

Functional
Differences

Interpersonal trust decisions appear to be heavily
influenced by our automatic emotional reactions, and by
our ability to assess the other person and anticipate her or
his course of action. These processes all show significant interindividual
variance.
Persons possessing psychopathic traits (e.g., persistently violating the rights of
others and being callous and unemotional) are generally thought not to behave
in trustworthy ways. This may be related – at least in part – to abnormalities in
their functional social cognitive circuitry. Because trust typically emerges from
a reciprocal exchange, these abnormalities can affect both how they perceive
others and how others perceive them.
Psychopaths are among the people with serious deficiencies in their ability to
(1) identify social cues, (2) to produce an appropriate reaction or response,
and (3) to regulate emotional reactions and behavioral responses (Phillips,
2003a; 2003b). Studies have shown they have significant difficulty discerning
emotion from others’ facial expressions and language; are particularly impaired
in identifying sadness and fear in others; and tend to have severe deficits in
their inhibitory controls and executive functioning (Gao & Raine, 2009). The
brain’s executive functions not only produce and shape high-level reasoning
and help put the brakes on impulsive actions, but they also play a vital role in
self- and other-monitoring that affects social sensitivity, social awareness, and
empathy (Herba, et al., 2007).
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For the past half-century behavioral geneticists have strived
to identify and understand how genetic variations might
account for individual differences in traits and behavior. Nearly all DNA is
composed from four nucleotides, which are represented as strands or
sequences by the letters A (adenine), C (cytosine), T (thymine), and G
(guanine). More than 99% of DNA sequences found in humans are identical
and have remained quite stable
across many generations of
SINGLE NUCLEOTIDE
evolutionary adaptation. That
POLYMORPHISMS
small margin of interindividual
variance, however, can produce
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) refers to a
substantial effects.
genetic variation where a particular DNA
sequence differs by just one nucleotide (hence
Genetic Variation and SNPs
“single nucleotide”) between individuals or
between a pair of chromosomes within a given
Because genes, like most
individual. From a molecular standpoint, this is a
cellular units, almost never
very minor difference, but the resulting effects
function in isolation, but rather
may be substantial. That tiny variation might
in the context of other genetic,
change the way a particular chemical receptor is
functional
and
structural
formed in the brain or even render the brain
influences,
discerning
the
unable to produce a particular chemical at all. It
effects of specific genes or
can also have substantive and multiple effects on
particular
behaviors
gets
other genes’ activity, which can also shape brain
complicated very quickly. More
functions. Changes in the way brain chemicals are
typically, genetic effects on
produced or function can profoundly affect our
behavior seem not to be direct
emotions, our ability to think, and a variety of
and singularly causal, but to
other behaviors.
occur by creating a “genetic
predisposition.”
An intriguing
development in the study of
interindividual genetic variation
is
the
single-nucleotide
polymorphism
(SNP,
pronounced as “snip”). A SNP
occurs when a particular DNA
sequence
differs
by
one
nucleotide
(hence
“single
nucleotide”) between individuals
or
between
paired
chromosomes within a given
individual.
As in the graphic above, the
sequence AACTAAC compared
to AATTAAC would be an
example of a SNP in which the
first cytosine (C) nucleotide in
the sequence was replaced by a
thymine (T) nucleotide. These
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small changes account for a large proportion of what makes humans
genetically different from one another (Syvanen, 2001). No specific allele or
DNA “trust sequence” has been found, though one particular SNP in OT
receptors has been implicated as a cause of social attachment/affiliative
deficits found in people with autism spectrum disorders (Jacob, et al., 2007).
The previously mentioned Williams syndrome is caused by the deletion of
genetic material from the region q11.23 of chromosome 7 (importantly, this
region has at least 25 genes, which also explains the cognitive impairment
associated with the pathological trusting behaviors in Williams Syndrome
patients).

Culture and Interpersonal Trust
Cultural factors comprise one of the primary externally-driven domains of
individual differences. Unlike many psychosocial constructs that have been
researched almost exclusively with European-American college students,
interpersonal trust has sparked quite a bit of intercultural and cross-cultural
inquiry. Edward T. Hall (1959), a pioneer in the study of intercultural
communication, speculated in the 1950s that persons from more collectivist
and “high context” cultures (such as Asia and the Middle East) might construe
and value interpersonal trust differently than persons from more individualistic
and “low context” cultures (such as the U.S. and Western Europe).

Low and High
Context
Communication

In low context communication, people transmit ideas
and sentiments primarily through words and specific,
detailed verbal descriptions. Meaning derived from high
context communication, however, relies much more
heavily on shared experiences and expectations between the parties. In
essence, high context communication assumes that one is transmitting ideas
to other members of one’s own ingroup. “Inside jokes” are an example of high
context communication. Hall suggested that in high context cultures the
collective bond or promise was a dominant determinant of trust, whereas in
low context cultures more reliance is placed on structural safeguards such as
contracts, rules, laws and enforcement of consequences (Hall, 1959).

Does Trust
Vary by
Country?

Having compared World Values Survey results from 60
nations, Delhey and Newton (2005) conclude that
“generalized trust is very unevenly distributed across the
globe” (p. 311), with estimates that “most people can be
trusted” ranging from 60% of the population in Norway and Sweden, to less
than 10% in Turkey and Brazil. They find that the “high trust” countries tend to
be those with greater ethnic heterogeneity, more pervasive Protestant religious
traditions, good governance, higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
and greater population equality among household incomes (Delhery & Newton,
2005). So, at a national level, trust seems to correlate with measures of
success. Hall’s cross cultural comparisons focused mainly on the contrast
between Japan and the United States. Subsequent cross cultural studies of
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trust have extended Hall’s work on Japan and the U.S. (Hayashi et al., 1999;
Yamagishi et al., 1998) but also expanded inquiry to include a wide array of
nations around the globe.
A very preliminary question has been whether “levels of trust” (presumably
referring to trust propensity and generalized trust) differ among countries.
Research studies have found that countries like Sweden, China, and the U.S.
are high on trust propensity, while countries like Russia, India, and Mexico, are
moderate, and citizens of countries like Romania or Brazil tend to have lower
trust propensity (Johnson & Cullen, 2002). Results have sometimes been
counter-intuitive: one study found, for example, that people in Bulgaria
(Koford, 2001) have higher trust levels than those in the U.S. A four-nation
study compared trust behaviors in a single round economic investment
dilemma game among nearly 600 participants from China, Japan, Korea, and
the United States, finding that – independent of ethnicity – U.S. and Chinese
nationals showed greater trust (more money “invested” in the partner player),
than those from Japan and Korea. The authors suggest that norms of
reciprocity and of trust may vary across countries (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes,
2002). Further interesting research has been done in trying to explain trust
behavior as explained by market integration and size of the group, and has
generally found that trust and trustworthiness varies across 15 different
societies based on several social and cultural factors (Henrich, 2004).

Does Trust
Vary Within a
Country?

Studies that have examined different trust and
reciprocation patterns within a given country have also
found significant differences, some of which appear to be
mediated by stereotypes (see Fershtman and Gneezy,
2001 for one such example comprising different ethnic groups in Israel and
Barr 2001, for a study comparing traditional and resettled villages in
Zimbabwe). Others however are much more complex to interpret. In the
Buchan, et al. (2002) four nation study, results demonstrated varied trends in
trust (how much of the initial endowment was given to the partner) and
reciprocation – what some would call trustworthiness (the amount of the
investment returned to the investor).
The Chinese participants showed high trust and high reciprocation, while the
Japanese participants had the reverse pattern, giving little of their endowment
and receiving little in return (see also Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006). The
U.S. group tended to show high trust but low reciprocity and the Korean group
showed low trust, but high reciprocity. This is consistent with findings by
Danielson and Holm (2002) that reciprocity norms seemed to apply similarly in
the U.S. and Sweden, but not in Tanzania, where reciprocity patterns were
substantially different. The Buchan et al (2002) study asked subjects to only
play a single round of the game, so we don’t know whether these patterns
might converge across multiple rounds. It certainly raises some intriguing
questions, however, about intergoup variance across cultures – such as what
causes these differences?; is it possible to shape a country’s trust?; and how
might this kind of knowledge affect intercultural negotiation?.

52

T H E

S C I E N C E

O F

I N T E R P E R S O N A L

T R U S T

How Might
Culture Affect
Trust?

What is the mechanism or mechanisms by which culture
might affect interpersonal trust? One of the distinguishing
factors discussed most often in the literature concerns the
extent to which members of a culture value and define
themselves by individualistic and independent features or by collectivist and
interdependent features of their identities (Hofstede, 1980; Markus and
Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto et al., 1998; Mesquita and Karasawa, 2002;
Triandis, 1995). We know from related social psychological research that
when people are dependent on others, they tend to perceive the others as
more trustworthy (Weber et al., 2007).
Cultural affinity toward collectivist vs individualist orientations can also affect
trust’s ingroup - outgroup dynamic, though not necessarily in expected ways.
In a number of studies, people not surprisingly tend to extend more trusting
behaviors to ingroup members than to outgroup members. When researchers
studied the phenomenon across countries, however, and randomly assigned
players either to a partner from the player’s own country or to a partner from a
different country, the more individualistic players showed a greater ingroup
trust preference than the collectivist players, who extended to their citizen
neighbors only the same degree of trust as they extend to the strangers
(Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002).
Independent vs interdependent orientations can affect a number of cognitive
and emotional processes related to trust. In each of these contexts, different
norms and values apply to emotional expression. Persons in interdependent
contexts tend to value emotional moderation and control and especially avoid
expressing negative and socially disengaging emotions (Kim and Markus,
2002; Kitayama et al., 2006; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Tsai et al., 2006; Wu
and Tseng, 1985). In independent and individualistic contexts, however,
emotional expression is regarded as “psychologically healthy” and a signal of
individual authenticity (Bellah et al., 1985; Kim and Sherman, 2007;
Matsumoto, 1990; Suh et al., 1998).
These emotional control patterns even correspond to different
neurophysiological responses (Goldin, et al., 2008). In a study comparing
Asian American (AA) and European American (EA) females’ reactions to an
anger evoking stimulus, AAs who valued emotional control felt less anger,
exhibited less angry behavior and showed a cardiovascular response
consistent with an active, motivated self-control response, and confidence in
their regulatory capacity.
For EA women, valuing emotional control
diminished angry behavior but did not reduce their experience of anger. Their
cardiovascular responses were more consistent with confronting a real threat,
perhaps because they did not have the same confidence (and/or experience)
in controlling their emotional reactions (Mauss & Butler, 2009).
Persons acculturated to independent and interdependent orientations have
been found to perceive the world, particularly the social world, in fundamentally
different ways. This line of research suggests that the effects of culture on
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social interactions are not just mediated by different social norms and beliefs,
but by moderating perceptions and encoding of social information.
Social psychologist Dr. Richard Nisbett at the University of Michigan has
advanced the exploration of these differences with rigor and depth, particularly
as they relate to patterns in behavioral differences between Westerners (e.g.,
Americans) and East Asians (e.g., Japanese and Chinese) (Nisbett, 2003;
Nisbett & Masuda, 2003). Nisbett and his team find, in general, that
Westerners make sense of their experiences and novel situations by:
(1) identifying and focusing primarily on a central object of interest;
(2) evaluating the object and its features to determine the category of
stimuli to which it belong; and
(3) using formal logic and analysis to understand the stimulus and its
actions.
East Asians, by contrast, tend to:
(1) focus primarily on the context – not a specific object – in a novel
situation;
(2) not to categorize the stimulus or its components, but to holistically view
the context as the “causal factor” in the event; and
(3) rely on dialectical reasoning (recursive analysis from multiple points of
view) and associative thinking rather than formal logic to discern
meaning from what they perceive.
They also suggest these perceptual differences originate and emerge from
operating in different social systems (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, A.,
2001).
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5
Section

Conclusion
To be trusted is a greater compliment than to be loved.
-

George Macdonald

Trust everybody, but cut the cards.
-

Finley Peter Dunne

I

nterpersonal trust is complicated, but integral to individuals and
organizations that operate in complex and dynamic environments where
human interactions are key to achieving goals. Understanding how, why
and when people decide to be (or not to be) vulnerable to others and how
they assess and decide how others are likely to behave toward them gets at
the heart of why many individuals and organizations striving to build trust
succeed or fail. It may even go some way in explaining why some
organizations and some diverse communities of professionals have an ability
to work collaboratively toward a common set of objectives, even in real world
competitive environments in which very little can be said to be “trustworthy.”
This research-based overview on interpersonal trust has explored the myriad
ways in which trust has been defined, how it operates, and the factors that
may cause it to work differently for some people than for others. It seems there
is a solid conceptual platform from which to launch a program of research on
interpersonal trust that might serve the long-term interests of academia,
industry, and government.
A number of challenges and a great deal of exciting work lie ahead. To
succeed, researchers as well as people whose work depends, in part, on trust
and assessing trustworthiness may need to re-examine some long-held
assumptions about trust’s relationship to deception, stress, and its role in
dealing with competitors as well as with allies.
In re-examining these assumptions, a trust-based research agenda may offer
individuals and organizations new payoffs and new opportunities. At the same
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time, it is clear that such an agenda must accept the inherent complexity of
human problems, knowing that human behavior does not necessarily operate
under orderly, universal laws like those that govern problems in fields such as
physics and engineering. The cautious researcher will proceed with the view
that humans are biopsychosocial organisms – neither determined exclusively
by nature nor nurture, but profoundly affected by both. Consequently, it is
unlikely that any researcher will find just “one thing” – biologically,
psychologically, socially, or technologically - that will explain everything about
interpersonal trust. People are composed of and operate within living systems
– the biological, psychological and social factors affect each other not just in
linear ways, but also recursively. And while humans are all carbon-based
entities that have similar DNA structures, there are also profound differences
between individuals that are likely to foil any attempts to find a “one-size-fitsall” approach to trust and trustworthiness.
With those caveats in mind, however, the literature suggests that many
research communities know considerably more about interpersonal trust today
than they did even a decade ago. With rigorous, persistent, and applied
scientific research, it is not unreasonable to expect that what is known about
trust in complex and dynamic environments will grow even more.
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Appendix A
SOME CLASSIFICATIONS OF TRUST: A SYNTHESIS
From Sandro Castaldo (2003)

Criteria
Trust dimensions

Typologies
-

Ideological, cognitive, emotional & routine trust (Lewis & Wiegert, 1985)

-

Affective, cognitive & behavioral trust (Cummings & Bromiley, 1996)

-

Behavioral & intentional trust (Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997)

-

Affect-based & cognition-based trust (McAllister, 1995)

-

Reliableness & emotional trust (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982)

-

Values, attitude and mood & emotions (Jones & George, 1998)

-

Institutionalization & habitualization (Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997)

-

Competence- & goodwill-based dimensions (Nooteboom, 1996)

-

Calculative, institutional (‘hyphenated’) & personal trust (Williamson, 1993)

-

Insititutional-based, system-based & societal trust (Lane, 1998)

-

Individual, inter-personal, institutional trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995)

-

Calculative, relational & institutional trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Cannon,
1998)

-

Dispositional, personal/interpersonal & system trust (McKnight & Chervany)

-

Calculative, knowledge-based & institutional (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996)

-

Deterrence-based, knowledge-based & identification-based trust (Shapiro,
Sheppard & Cheraskin, 1992; Sheppard & Tuckinski, 1996)

-

Calculative, cognitive & normative trust (Lane,1998; Child, 1998)

-

Contractual trust, competence trust & goodwill trust (Sako, 1991; Sako & Helper,
1998)

-

Predictability-based & value-based trust (Sitkin & Roth, 1993)

-

Predictability & explorative trust (Huemer, 2000)

-

Full, instable & hopeful trust (Andaleeb, 1992)

-

Thick or thin, weak or strong, fragile or resilient trust (Williams, 1989, Meyerson,

Relational layer

Contents and antecedents

Strength/Quality
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Weick & Kramer, 1996)

Development processes

Other classifications

Contiguous concepts

-

Weak, semi-strong & strong trust (Barney & Hansen, 1994)

-

Tust vs. distrust (many authors, e.g. Andaleeb, 1992)

-

Characteristic-based, process-based, institutionally-based (Zucker, 1986)

-

Calculative processes, predictive processes, intention-based processes,
knowledge-based processes, transfer-based processes (Doney & Cannon, 1997;
Doney, Cannon & Mullen, 1998)

-

Basic trust, guarded trust & extended trust (Brenkert, 1998)

-

Deterrence, obligation, discovery & internalization (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998)

-

Task-focused, fiduciary & relational forms of trust (Barber, 1983)

-

Spontaneous trust, generated trust, manipulation & capitulation (Hardy, Phillips &
Lawrence, 1998)

-

Trust, faith, confidence & reputation (Luhmann, 1989; Hart, 1989)

-

Trust, power & commitment (Gambetta, 1989; Anderson & Weitz, 1993; Morgan
& Hunt, 1994)

-

Rational prediction, probable anticipation, uncertainty, panic, fate, faith (Lewis &
Wiegert, 1985)
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Appendix B
Trust Concepts
McKnight and Chervany (2001-2002)

Higher Order Concept Facets
Disposition to trust, based on
a
person’s
longstanding
temperamental or personality
factors (p. 47)

-

Faith in humanity (underlying assumptions about people) means that one
assumes others are usually competent, benevolent, honest/ethical, and predictable

-

Trusting stance (personal strategy) means that, regardless of what one assumes
about other people generally, one assumes that one will achieve better outcomes
by dealing with people as though they were well-meaning and reliable

Institution-based
trust,
comprising
the
situational,
contextual and environmental
factors – rather than individual
ones- that determine trust (p.
48).

-

Structural assurance means that one believes that protective structures—
guarantees, contracts, regulations, promises, legal recourse, processes, or
procedures—are in place that are conducive to situational success (p. 48).

-

Situational normality means that one believes that the situation in a venture is
normal or favorable or conducive to situational success (p. 48).

-

Trusting belief-competence means that one believes that the other party has the
ability or power to do for one what one needs done.

-

Trusting belief-benevolence means that one believes that the other party cares
about one and is motivated to act in one’s interest.

-

Trusting belief-integrity means that one believes that the other party makes
good-faith agreements, tells the truth, acts ethically, and fulfills promises

-

Trusting belief-predictability means that one believes the other party’s actions
(good or bad) are consistent enough that one can forecast them in a given
situation.

-

Willingness to depend means that one is volitionally prepared to make oneself
vulnerable to the other party in a situation by relying on the other party

-

Subjective probability of depending means the extent to which one forecasts or
predicts that one will depend on the other party.

Trusting beliefs, which include
the trustor’s appraisals about the
trustee’s
competence,
benevolence, integrity, and
predictability (p. 49)

Trusting intentions, which
reflect the trustor’s willingness to
be vulnerable and to depend on
the behavior of the trustee (p.
50)

73

T H E

S C I E N C E

O F

I N T E R P E R S O N A L

T R U S T

Appendix C
Benefits of Trust for Organizations
Adapted primarily from Dirks & Ferrin (2001) and Romano (2002)

Trust facilitates:

Empirical support offered in:

Productive working relationships and Braddach, J. L., & Eccles, R. G. (1989). Price, authority, and trust:
From ideal types to plural forms. Annual Review of Sociology,
competitive business advantage
15, 97-118.
Creed, W. E. D., & Miles, R. E., (1996). Trust in organizations: A
conceptual framework linking organizational forms, managerial
philosophies, and the opportunity costs of controls. In R. M.
Kramer & T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of
theory and research (pp. 16-38). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. (1994). Developmental processes of
cooperative interorganizational relationships. Academy of
Management Review, 19, 90-118.
Wicks, A. C., Berman, S. L., & Jones, T. M. (1999). The structure of
optimal trust: Moral and strategic implications. Academy of
Management Review, 24 (1), 99-116.

Strategic
cooperation

collaboration

and McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as
foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations.
Academy of Management Journal, 38, 24-59.
Tsai, W., S. Ghoshal. 1998. Social capital and value creation: The
role of intra-firm networks. Academy of Management Journal, 41,
464-476. (via increased resource exchange between
organizations)

Organizational citizenship behavior

Deluga, R. J. (1995). The relation between trust in the supervisor
and subordinate organizational citizenship behavior. Military
(via trust in superiors/leaders, coPsychology, 7 (1), 1-16.
workers, and organization)
Konovsky, M. A., & Pugh, S. D. (1994). Citizenship behavior and
social exchange. Academy of Management Journal, 37 (3), 656-
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669. (via trust in leader)
McAllister, D. 1995. Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations
for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of
Management Journal, 38, 24-59. (via trust in co-workers)
Pillai, R., C. Schriesheim, E. Williams, 1999. Fairness perceptions
and trust as mediators for transformational and transactional
leadership: A two-study sample. Journal of Management, 25,
897-933. (via trust in leader)
Podsakoff, P., S. MacKenzie, R. Moorman, R. Fetter. 1990.
Transformational leader behaviors and their effects on followers’
trust in leader, satisfaction, and organizational citizenship
behaviors. Leadership Quarterly, 1, 107-142. (via trust in leader)
Robinson, S. 1996. Trust and the breach of the psychological
contract. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 574-599. (via
trust in organization)

Conflict resolution

De Dreu, C., E. Giebels, E. Van de Vliert. 1998. Social motives and
trust in integrative negotiation: The disruptive effects of punitive
capability. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 408-423. (via trust
between negotiators)
Parks, C. D., Henager, R. F., & Scamahorn, S. D. (1996). Trust and
reactions to messages of intent in social dilemmas. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 40 (1), 134-151.
Porter, T., B. Lilly. 1996. The effects of conflict, trust, and task
commitment on project team performance. The International
Journal of Conflict Management, 7, 361-376.
Schurr, P. & Ozanne. J. (1985). Influences on exchange processes:
Buyers’ preconceptions of a seller’s trustworthiness and
bargaining toughness. Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 939953. (via positive effect on negotiations)

Openness in communication
(within and between organizations)

Benton, A., E. Gelber, H. Kelley, B. Liebling. (1969). Reactions to
various degrees of deceit in a mixed-motive relationship. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, 170-180. (trust in
partner >> increased perception of increased information
accuracy)
Boss, R. W. (1978). Trust and managerial problem solving revisited.
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Group & Organization Studies, 3, 331-342.
Roberts, K., C. O’Reilly. 1974. Failures in upward communication in
organizations: Three possible culprits. Academy of Management
Journal, 17, 205-215. (trust in leader >> increased perception of
increased information accuracy)
Smith, J. & Barclay, D. (1997). The effects of organizational
differences and trust on the effectiveness of selling partner
relationships. Journal of Marketing, 61, 3-21.
Zand, D. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 229-239.

Employee job satisfaction

Andeleeb, S. S. (1996). An experimental investigation of satisfaction
and commitment in marketing channels: The role of trust and
dependence. Journal of Retailing, 72 (1), 77-93.
Boss, R. W. (1978). Trust and managerial problem solving revisited.
Group & Organization Studies, 3, 331-342. (via satisfaction with
meeting)
Brockner, J., Siegel, P. A., Daly, J. P., Tyler, T., & Martin, C. (1997).
When trust matters: The moderating effect of outcome
favorability. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 558-583. (via
increased satisfaction with/support for leader)
Driscoll, J. (1978). Trust and participation in organizational decision
making as predictors of satisfaction. Academy of Management
Journal, 21, 44-56.
Muchinsky, P. (1977). Organizational communication: Relationships
to organizational climate and job satisfaction. Academy of
Management Journal, 20, 592-607. (via positive perceptions of
organizational climate)
O’Reilly, C. A., K. H. Roberts. 1974. Information filtration in
organizations: Three experiments. Organizational Behavior and
Human Performance, 11, 253-265. (via satisfaction with
communication)
Rich, G. A. (1997). The sales manager as a role model: Effects on
trust, job satisfaction, and performance of salespeople. Journal
of the Academy of Marketing Science, 25 (4), 319-328.
Roberts, K., C. O’Reilly. 1974. Failures in upward communication in
organizations: Three possible culprits. Academy of Management
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Journal, 17, 205-215. (via satisfaction with communication)
Ward, E. A. (1997). Autonomous work groups: A field study of
correlates of satisfaction. Psychological Reports, 80, 60-62. (via
satisfaction with work group)
Zand, D. (1972). Trust and managerial problem solving.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 229-239. (via satisfaction
with meeting)

Individual employee performance

Earley, P. C. (1986). Trust, perceived importance of praise and
criticism, and work performance: An examination of feedback in
the United States and England. Journal of Management, 12,
457-473. (via trust in supervisor)
Oldham, G. (1975). The impact of supervisory characteristics on
goal acceptance. Academy of Management Journal, 18, 461475. (via trust in leader)
Rich, G. (1997). The sales manager as a role model: Effects on
trust, job satisfaction and performance of salespeople. Journal of
the Academy of Marketing Science, 25, 319-328. (via trust in
manager/leader)
Robinson, S. (1996). Trust and the breach of the psychological
contract. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 574-599. (via
trust in organization)

Work group/unit performance

Davis, J., Schoorman, F., Mayer, R., & Tan, H. (2000). Trusted unit
manager and business unit performance: Empirical evidence of
a competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 21,
563-576. (via trust in manager)
Dirks, K. T. 1999. The effects of interpersonal trust on work group
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 445–455. (via
trust within group)
Dirks, K. T. (2000). Trust in leadership and team performance:
evidence from NCAA basketball. The Journal of Applied
Psychology, 85(6), 1004-1012. (via trust in leader)
Schurr, P., J. Ozanne. 1985. Influences on exchange processes:
Buyers’ preconceptions of a seller’s trustworthiness and
bargaining toughness. Journal of Consumer Research, 11, 939953. (via positive effect of trust between negotiators on the
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dyad’s performance)
Kegan, D. & Rubenstein, A. (1973). Trust, effectiveness, and
organizational development: A field study in R&D. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 9, 498-513. (via trust within group)

Employee acceptance of (and Kim, W. & Mauborgne, R. (1993). Procedural justice, attitudes, and
subsidiary top management compliance with multinationals’
compliance
with)
management/leadership’s goals and
corporate strategic decisions. Academy of Management Journal,
36, 502-526.
decisions
Oldham, G. (1975). The impact of supervisory characteristics on
goal acceptance. Academy of Management Journal, 18, 461475.
Rousseau, D., & Tijoriwala, S. 1999. What's a good reason to
change? Motivated reasoning and social accounts in promoting
organizational change. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 514528. (trust in management >> greater acceptance of rationale for
organizational change)
Tyler, T. & Degoey, P. (1996). Trust in organizational authorities:
The influence of motive attributions and willingness to accept
decisions. In R. M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in
Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Organizational commitment

Brockner, J., Siegel, P. A., Daly, J. P., Tyler, T., & Martin, C. (1997).
When trust matters: The moderating effect of outcome
favorability. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 558-583.
Robinson, S. 1996. Trust and the breach of the psychological
contract. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41, 574-599.
Yamagishi, T., Cook, K. S., & Watabe, M. (1998). Uncertainty, trust,
and commitment formation in the United States and Japan.
American Journal of Sociology, 104 (1), 165-194.

Fairness and justice perceptions

Brockner, J., Siegel, P. A., Daly, J. P., Tyler, T., & Martin, C. (1997).
When trust matters: The moderating effect of outcome
favorability. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43, 558-583.
Fulk, J., A. Brief, S. Barr. 1985. Trust-in-supervisor and perceived
fairness and accuracy of performance evaluations. Journal of
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Business Research, 13, 301-313. (trust in supervisor >>
increased perception of fairness in performance evaluation)
Lind, E. A., T. R. Tyler, Y. Huo. 1997. Procedural context and
culture: Variation in the antecedents of procedural justice
judgements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73,
767-780. (via perceptions of procedural justice)

Customer satisfaction

Chow, S., & Holden, R. (1997). Toward and understanding of loyalty:
The moderating role of trust. Journal of Managerial Issues, 9 (3),
275-298.
Swan, J. E., Bowers, M. R., & Richardson, L. D. (1999). Customer
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